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Affidavit of Andrew Marsh in Support of Claim for Attorneys Fees, dated April 12,2010 with the
Exhibits, Nos. 1-10.
Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for Attorney Fee Hearing, dated April 12,2010 (found in Agency
Record on page 567 of Volume 3).

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS:

1.

Transcript of Hearing on November 23,2009, Laurel Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center and
Indemnity Insurance Company ofNA; I.e. No. 2006-012770.

2.

Transcript of hearing on May 11,2010, Tim Stienmetz v. G2B Co., Inc. and State Insurance
Fund, I.C. No. 2008-002191.

3.

Transcript of Hearing on April 12, 2010, Maria Gomez v. Nampa Lodging Investors, Inc.,
and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation; I.C. No. 2005-510285
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
--~Boise;-Idaho-837ez--""-

Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

I' __ ,__ , l_:
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770

vs.
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

C01v1ES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES "
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AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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BENEFITS, paid prior to Lump Sum, subjected to atty fees
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to Lump Sum, on the above

$13,206.88
$3301.72
~~~~----~--C--oS'f-S,incurr-ed-ifrHt-igatien,pr-evieusly-r-eimbl:li-sed-ro-attBmey-finGl-.-----$1,3943-1-------experts Radnovich and Barros-Bailey)

LUMP SUM AMOUNT, New Money
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS, to be paid from LSS
Attorney Fees
Costs
TOTAL, Attorney Fees and Costs, to be paid from LSS
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from Lump Sum
NET LUMP SUM AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT

$13,000.00
-$3,250.00
-$10.00
-$3,260.00
-$0.00
$9,740.00

Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney
Attorney Fee Agreement including Disclosure Statement

STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
1.

Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by Laurel Kulm

("Claimant") on or about 5/30/2007.
2.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential
disability beyond impairment, etc.
3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P .A.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a
periodic basis.
8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation
case.
9.

Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed

Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and impairment
compensation, and disability beyond impairment, and retraining, and attorney fees. Subsequent

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
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to retaining Counsel, Claimant received additional medical treatment and time loss benefits and
impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment compensation.

~-----1-0:---C--ounsel-advised-€laimanHo4lllder-go-a-new-and-separat-e-indepefldent-me-dieal ~---',\c------

I
)

evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import ofthe IME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
11.

Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by

a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the

/

need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
12.

Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in

extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing.
13.

Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would

be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers.
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for
resolution to the Commission.
14.

Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants

resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
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15.

Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and

personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been
~- ---stlbmitteci-t"tTihe-C-mnmission-f-erits-appmval.

16.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed

portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant.
17.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing

program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and
other fmancial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial
Commission Form 1022.
18.

As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between

Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately
5/30/2007 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining

certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his
other clients.
19.

Claimant is presently employed.

Dated May 5,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

:t~~

An
Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on May 5, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
lRl Hand Delivered
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

H~~

ewMarsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtie Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
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'1
CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE
---'Fhis--is-an-agreement-f{)r-representat-ion-arui-eonsultation--in--a-worker'e-s- - compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Laurel Kulm, (hereafter referred
to as "Clientn ).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Kulm v. Mercy Medical
Center with respect to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of
November 2, 2006 only.
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That
portion will be as follows:
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless
it is later disputed.
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
. iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an

appeal has been filed by either party;
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater.

7

3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to
withdraw due to lackOf cooperation m presenting and prosecuting Cllent~~s-
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below.
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney,
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by
Attorney, these costs will be repaid. from Client's portion of amounts
recovere!!, as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney,
filing fees, fees for coJ.U1reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process,
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent.
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval.
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are
good faith statements of opinion only;
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged

Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows:
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, AttorIley
shall be paid at the rate of $150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer,
if any, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such
services.
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ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the
----.p....r..,....o'"visiOIIS of this-agreementjust-as-if-the-verdict,awarci,-cietermination
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client.

iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall
have a lien on the cause of action.
8) Client '+Yill pay to :fAtome~' an iaitial retainer as Bfl advanee against the costs
rererred to in Paragraph 4 above in the amount of$100.
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts program.
lO)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and
agree to its tenns and conditions. There are no other oral or written
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this
contract shall be made in writing.
ll)This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives
and assigns of Client and Attorney.
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case
within 30 days after settlement or after the· attorney client relationship is
terminated by either party to this agreement. Mter that time, Attorney's fIJ.e,
and ali documents and things in it from whatever sou.rce will be destroyed.
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain
Attorney on an hourly basis. and has chosen to retain Attorney on the
contingent basis described herein.

I have read the
basis, this

/

i!"

fOregOin~Hne

day of

~a~
.

LaurKlIiIIl; Client.

to retain the attorney on an hourly
, lOO~.

.
9

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
- - - - - ; 1 . -ffi-workersLeompensation-matters,-attorney!s--fees-normaHy-dtt-not-exeeeti--------·----twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you.
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees,
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute.

I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein.
DATEDthis

J~ dayof9~

,20oL.

~Q.~

LaurelKulm

~ day Of-w~~_-,20rL.
Wm. Breck Seiniger,
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
Attorney for Client
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SEINIGER LA W OFFICES, P.A.

Statement of Costs

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
(208) 345-1000
Andrew@ldahoRights.com

I

DATE

I

4/16/09

CLIENT NAME
Laurel Kuhn

DATE
07/31107
08/07/07
08/07/07
12/13/07
12/27/07
12127/07
02/01108
02/01108
02/01108
02/28/08
07/16/08
09/04/08
10/03/08
10/27/08
01113/09
04/13/09

DESCRIPTION
Balance forward
Copies" NY work comp to Radnovich
Postage'
Kuhn, Laurel Impairinent rating
Copies - Ltr to Rogers with Radnovich report
Postage
Copies - L to Barros w- CD
Postage
compact disc
PMT #400151830. Kuhn, L. costs
PMT #400131602. Kuhn, L. costs for upcoming voc eval
2/8/08,4/15/08, 8/1108, 8/18/08, 8/22/08 (6.1 hours at $135.00 per)
Long Distance
PMT #400058744. Kuhn, L. costs
PMT # 1695. Kuhn, Laurel expert payment
File Closing

ATIORNEY

OUR FILE NO.

ACM

2827

AMOUNT
9.60
2.33
550.00
1.80
0.41
0.15
0.58
5.00
-569.87
-500.00
823.50
1.00
-30.13
-294.37
10.00

I BALANCE DUE II

BALANCE
0.00
9.60
11.93
561.93
563.73
564.14
564.29
564.87
569.87
0.00
-500.00
323.50
324.50
294.37
0.00
10.00

$10.00

Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2)
years from the above date.
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ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL
C. W. Moore Plaza
250 S. 5 th Street, Suite 700
P. O. Box 7426
Boise, 10 83707-7426
Telephone: (208) 344-5800
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510
Alan K. Hull - ISB No.: 1568

LLP

Attorneys for Defendants

-

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OFtt,DARO
-C:)

LAUREL KULM,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 06-012770mO -

tJ

vs.
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT,
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT, AND ORDER OF
APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE

INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NORTH AMERICA,
Surety,
Defendants.

In consideration of the premises and promises and covenants hereinafter
set forth and subject to the Commission's approval and Order of Discharge
pursuant thereto, the above-entitled parJo stipulate and agree as follows.
On or about November 2, 2006, Laurel Kulm, hereinafter referred to as
Claimant, suffered an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of her
employment with Mercy Medical Center, hereinafter referred to as Employer.
On the date of the accident, the Employer had assured its liability under the
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho with Indemnity Insurance
Company of North America, hereinafter referred to as Surety. The Employer,
Surety and the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho received adequate and
timely notice of the accident and injury.

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 1

At the time of said accident, Claimant was 54 years of age, single, and had
no children under the age of 18. Claimant worked varjous hours per week and
earned $22.60 per hour. Claimant incurred no time loss as a result of the injury.
In the accident of November 2, 2006 Claimant was walking when she slipped
and fell, injuring her lower/mid back, neck, and both knees.
1

Claimant/s
prior medical history is significant for hypertension,
hypothyroidism, type II diabetes, sleep apnea, neck and lower back injuries and
bilateral meniscal tears and repairs in the summer of 2006.
l

On November 3, 2006, Claimant presented to Saltzer Medical Group
complaining of pain after falling. Claimant advised that while she had fallen onto
her knees she had hit her back against the wall. Claimant denied any numbness
or tingling, as well as any swelling, decreased range of motion, instability,
crepitus or joint pain. Other than tenderness with palpation over the paraspinous
musculature throughout the entire spine, the examination was within normal
limits. Claimant was released to modified duty with no lifting, bending or pulling
over 15 pounds, as well as no twisting.
l

On November 15, 2006, Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical Group
complaining of bilateral knee pain with somewhat limited range of motion.
Claimant had no gross swelling but she was tender at the medial line. The
assessment was sprain/strain of the medial and collateral ligaments. She was
placed in a right knee brace. She was later given a left knee brace.
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on November 29, 2006, at which time
she was released to full duty with no restrictions.
On January 17, 2007, Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical for right leg
pain and "pulling" since January 12, 2007, when she was injured while walking
down a hall after physical therapy when her low back went out causing her to
almost fall. She advised that she had low back, right hip, and right leg pain.
There was weakness noted of the left leg and Claimant complained of weakness
in the left lower back, hip and leg. Claimant was assessed with strain/sprain of
the hip/thigh, low back and groin. She was placed on modifiedduty.
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on February 21, 2007 and reported
that overall she was doing much better, with the majority of her complaints in the
lumbar area. With regard to the knees, it was opined that she was fixed and
stable. Claimant was released to full duty, no restrictions.
On February 26, 2007, Claimant presented to Nancy Greenwald, M.D .. Dr.
Greenwald noted that Claimant's gait was good and she was able to walk without
difficulty. Straight leg raise was negative. Sensory and manual muscle testing in
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 2
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the lower extremities was normal. Claimant's knees were back to baseline. It
was noted that Claimant had preexisting arthritis and had already established a
relationship with a chiropractor when she moved to Idaho. Dr. Greenwald felt
that Claimant had mild soft tissue injuries and there were no radicular findings.
Claimant could continue working without restriction.
Claimant saw Dr. Greenwald on March 15, 2007. Dr. Greenwald noted
that a lumbar spine of the hip demonstrated a larger right piriformis and a cyst.
Claimant's main complaint was right buttock pain. Dr. Greenwald recommended
pool therapy.
Claimant returned to Dr. Greenwald on April 4, 2007, complaining of a new
onset of right leg pain and numbness, beginning about two weeks earlier when
she awoke.
She was continuing regular chiropractic treatments and Dr.
Greenwald advised her to discontinue those. Straight leg raise was negative. Dr.
Greenwald ordered an MRI.
In an April 26, 2007 letter to the Surety, Dr. Greenwald noted that an April
5, 2007 MRI showed a moderate-sized disc herniation at L3-4 which was right
paracentral in location with mass effect upon the descending right L4 nerve root I
the epidural space.
Claimant denied any acute incident, accident, hobby or
activity that caused the sudden extreme pain.
Essentially, Claimant had
awakened with pain down her right side.
In order to address causation, Dr.
Greenwald recommended review of all chiropractic and other prior medical
records.
In a June 6, 2007 letter to
review of Claimant's prior records,
of 2007 followed therapy which
2006, injury, then that near-fall
related.

the Surety, Dr. Greenwald advised, following
that if the physical therapy incident in January
was prescribed for Claimant's November 2,
and subsequent right sided pain were work

On June 12, 2007, Claimant's position with the Employer was discontinued
due to a reduction in work force.
On August 2, 2007, Claimant presented to Beth Rogers, M.D., for
complaints of right anterior leg pain, low back pain, right knee pain, and
occasional non-radiating cervical pain.
Dr. Rogers' impression was right L4
radiculopathy, status post bilateral partial medial meniscectomies with underlying
degenerative changes in both knees, left great~r than right, with the right knee
being more symptomatic, resolving patellofemoral contusion, and mild cervical
strain. Dr. Rogers noted that in review of Claimant's medical records, there were
approximately 122 visits for chiropractic care to address issues with Claimant's
cervical spine, lumbar spine and bilateral knees. The visits occurred both prior
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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and subsequent to the November 2006 industrial injury. Due to the complaints
that Claimant had following that injury, she believed the lumbar radiculopathy was
a result of said injury.
She felt Claimant's knees were at baseline and she
recommended a right L4 transforaminal epidural, as well as a directed course of
physical therapy. She pi aced Claimant on modified work. On August 6, 2007,
Dr. Rogers released Claimant for her regular work.
On November 7, 2007, Claimant advised Dr. Rogers that she had no pain in
the right leg and overall her back was much better. Dr. Rogers felt Claimant was
medically stable and gave her a 5 % whole person impairment. Dr. Rogers also
felt that, given Claimant's disc protrusion, a 50 pound weight limit was a
reasonable permanent restriction and therefore Claimant could continue doing her
time of injury job.
../'

In August of 2008, Claimant's counsel has a disability evaluation performed "
by Mary Barros-Bailey, Ph.D., CRC, CDMS, CLCP, NCC, D/ABVE. Following her
interview of Claimant, and a labor market survey, Dr. Barros opined that Claimant
sustained a 7- to 10% disability, inclusive of impairment.
Claimant is working at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center.
Pertinent medical records are attached to the original Agreement as Exhibit
11

A".

There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the
parties as to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need
for retraining, and the need for future medical benefits.
Claimant and Defendants, desiring to settle the controversies in an amicable
way and to avoid the cost and delay of litigation of this claim and to buy their
peace, have entered into a settlement agreement which is acceptable to Claimant
and to the Defendants and which is in the best interest of the parties. By reason
of said settlement agreement, the parties hereto desire to settle and forever
conclude Claimant's rights under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of
Idaho. Claimant has offered to accept and the Defendants have offered to pay
the sum of $13,000.00, as itemized below, as full and final settlement of
Claimant's claim. The parties agree that settlement is in the best interests of the
parties.
It is stipulated and agreed that the aforementioned settlement consideration
includes loss of wage earning capacity and non-medical factors, should such
exist.
The parties waive any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as part of
the consideration for this agreement. Claimant hereto specifically and expressly
waives all rights to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided for under
Idaho Code § 72-718.
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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In processing this claim, medical expenses in the amount of $12,651.99
have been incurred by Claimant and paid by the Surety as itemized below:
Doctors:
Physical Therapy:
Miscellaneous:
Pharmacy:
Diagnostic Tests:

$ 4,659.89
1,736.97
3,631.74
84.87
2,538.52

TOTAL

$12,651.99

CLAIMANT UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES
NOT ITEMIZED AS BEING PAID ARE HER RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT UPON
APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE DEFENDANTS WILL HAVE NO FURTHER
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED TO DATE OR TO BE
INCURRED IN THE FUTURE, EXCEPT AS HEREIN BEFORE PROVIDED.
v

Claimant hereby attests that 1) she is not currently on Medicare; and 2)
does not expect to be on Medicare in 30 months and that she does not have a
settlement of over $250,000.00 Claimant attests that neither she nor any of her
medical providers to her knowledge received Medicare benefits, as provided under
42 USC Section 1395, as a result of the work-related injuries sustained on
November 2, 2006, set forth herein.
The parties hereby recognize that errors running to the benefit of either
party may have been made in the benefit computations while processing
Claimant's claim and hereby agree and stipulate that the lump sum consideration
to be paid upon approval of this agreement takes into account all such errors
found in the accounting and further stipulate and agree that the Industrial
Commission is empowered to make any necessary corrections in the accounting
without the necessity of any party creating an addendum, so long as the amount
to be paid Claimant, $13,000.00, is not affected.
An itemization of Claimant's claim as required by the Industrial Commission
is as follows:
Permanent Physical Impairment5 % of the whole person
25 weeks @ $310.75 per week

$ 7,768.75

Permanent Partial Disability9%vof the whole person,
including impairment, or 4%
20 weeks @ $310.75 per week

6,215.00

lump Sum Consideration(Includes any decreased wage e_arning
capacity, non-medical factors and
permanent partial disability, if any)
TOTAL:

/

12,223.13

$26,206.88

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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LESS:
PPI benefits paid to date
PPD benefits paid to date

7,768.75t/
5,438.13

AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT

$13,000.00

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS:

A.

Attorney fees taken prior to LSS

B.

Costs taken prior to LSS

C.

Additional attorney fees to be
taken from LSS

D.

Additional costs to be taken
from LSS

($550 Dr . Radnovich &

$3,301.72
$1,394.37

$823.50 Dr. Barros-Bailey)
$3,250.00

$10.00

ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS
Do not deduct from lump sum settlementl
amount due Claimant
NONE

ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS
TO BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider & amount)
NONE

E.

Total of Outstanding Medicals
To be deducted from lump sum settlementl
amount due Claimant
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT
(Subtract Lines C & D relating
to attorney fees, and Line E
relating
to
outstanding
the
total
medicals,
from
amount due Claimant of this
LSS)

$0.00

$9,740.00/'

The parties acknowledge that the nature and . extent o'f this injury ,
temporary and permanent partial disability, permanent impairment, medical and
related expenses in this matter are uncertain and may be continuing or
progressive and may exceed those hereinbefore set forth, and the above shall not
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 6

limit the scope of this agreement or the order of discharge entered by the
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and
claims to all permanent and temporary compensation and all medical and related
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discovered or contemplated by the
parties, except as herein before specifically provided.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and subject to the
approval of this entire agreement by the Industrial Commission of the State of
Idaho, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Commission may make and
enter its order approving a lump sum settlement of this claim by the payment to
Claimant by the Surety of the sum of $13,000.00.
IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that this payment is in full and final
settlement and release of all claims of Claimant, her heirs and representatives, for
compensation for total and partial temporary disability, medical expenses, both
past and future, specific indemnity for permanent disability, decreased wage
earning capacity, and any and all claims which Claimant and her heirs now have
or may have against the Defendants in the future on account of such accident
and/or injury under the worker's compensation laws of the State of Idaho.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendant Surety shall
pay the sum within thirty days following their receipt of the approved and
conformed copy of this entire agreement.
Any interest allowable under the
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue
until after the thirty-day period.
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED, STIPULATED AND AGREED that Claimant
understands that by entering into this agreement, and upon its approval by the
Industrial Commission, her compensation claims and all rights in connection
therewith will be finally and forever settled and closed and that she will be forever
barred from reopening this claim or otherwise claiming additional compensation
benefits on account of such accident and/or injury.
Claimant does agree to INDEMNIFY, DEFEND and HOLD MERCY MEDICAL
CENTER and INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
HARMLESS from and against any further claim for benefit which is, or may be,
payable pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho and
which arose out of or is related to said accident and/or injury.
This
indemnification and hold harmless agreement shall in no way inure to the benefit
of any third party or any party not herein specifically named.
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED AND AGREED by the parties that it is in their
best interests that this claim be finally and forever settled, satisfied and
discharged, and the parties hereto acknowledge that this agreement is made at
Claimant's request and is the acceptance of her offer by the Defendants.
Claimant acknowledges that she has carefully read this agreement and legal
instrument in itsenticety,basce_cejy_edthe advice of hercouns_el, _and that she
understands its contents and has signed the same knowing that this agreement
forever concludes and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and
character that she has or may have against the Defendants on account of the
above injuries.
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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Attorney for Claimant

MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, and
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH A
AlCA, Surety

A

0LU) I-hL4c@
STATE OF H3A116

~

}

k \:

of~\;.,

County

J

SS.

LAUREL KULM, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says;

That she is the Claimant in the above-entitled claim;
That she has read the foregoing lump sum agreement, knows the contents
thereof and believes the same to be true to the best of her knowledge.

S~IBSCRrBED

A,pr

,

".
•

I

\

AND
,

SWORN

day

of

2009.
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE
UPON LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly
come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and
the best interests of the parties herein are, and will be, served by approving this
agreement granting the order of discharge as prayed for,
NOW, THEREFORE, the foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be and
the same herein is approved, and further, the above-entitled proceedings are
hereby dismissed and concluded with prejudice.
DATED this

day of - - - - - - -, 2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

By~~

_______________

Chairman

By~

__~__________________

Member

By~_~

_________________

Member
ATTEST:

By~~

____~__________

Assistant Secretary

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on
, a true and correct copy
of STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT,
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE and STIPULATION AND ORDER OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, I.C. No.: 06-012770, was served by the method
indicated below upon each of the following:

__ U.s.

MAIL

_ _ COURIER - - - HAND DELIVERED

Andrew Marsh
942 W Myrtle
Boise, 10 83702
Kate Beaudreau
leM, Inc.
1150 W State, #330
Boise, 10 83702
Alan K. Hull
Anderson, Julian & Hull
250 South 5 th , #700
P. O. Box 7426
Boise, 10 83707

nDr~I~liA.1
U I \ I U I 1\1 r\ L
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
--- Boise;-Idaho-839B2--~-----Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

-----~-

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 06-012770
vs.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF
FORM 1022

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files this MEMORANDUM on the issue of
Counsel's right to attorney fees on permanent partial impairment awards, together with the
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached hereto and the Exhibits attached to said Affidavit, all in
support of his claim of attorney's fees as set forth in Counsel's Form 1022 already on file with
the Commission.

APPLICABLE LAW
The law governing claimants' right to be represented by an attorney in a workers'
compensation case, and the constitutional right of that attorney to be paid an attorney's fee, was
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Curr as follows':
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W, Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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In sua sponte reducing appellants' uncontested attorney fee agreements without
the suitable advance notice to all of the parties directly involved, accomplished
··through-properly-enacted-regulations,-and-without-a-meaningfui-hearing,the-----.- --..--.-------------Commission has acted in disregard of important constitutional mandates.
Specifically, the Commission's current stance, as Seiniger aptly points out, fails to
compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and fails to recognize
efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for
medical care or procuring an impairment rating. Moreover, the Commission's
arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients,
thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new
money" provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters
once again contravening I.C. § 72-508. The net result of the Commission's sua
sponte conduct is a deprivation of appellants' property rights under the fee
agreement without due process of law. Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692,864
P.2d 132, 138 (Idaho 1993). (bold emphasis added)

First, the Court found that an attorney has a constitutional right to be paid for services
rendered on the whole case, including services rendered as counselor and advocate.
Second, the Court found that payment of attorney fees cannot be limited to the basis of
"new money," because that would prevent claimants from receiving legal representation and
counseling except in "disputed matters." In other words, attorneys would be forced to decline
representation in cases where at least some (but not necessarily all) of the benefits will likely be
paid.
The reasoning for the Court's holding is obvious: When a potential client first consults an
attorney, it is never clear what benefits, if any, the claimant will ultimately actually be paid.
Even in a case wherein the claim appears to have been "accepted" by the surety, many
defenses can be raised by the employer/surety during the course of representation, negotiations,
or litigation, including the following:

SEINIGER u..W OFFICES, PA

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(208) 345-1000
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•

Apportionment for alleged "pre-existing conditions," which allegation can be used by
defendants to reduce a permanent partial impairment benefit.

•

Alleging that claimant "quit his job" during a period in which the claimant was released
for light-duty work.

•

Alleging that claimant "was terminated for cause" during a period in which the claimant
was released for light-duty work.
There are other circumstances in which a claimant may need the services of an advocate

or litigator in an undisputed-injury case:
•

Refusal by a surety to authorize recommended medical treatment.

•

Efforts by a surety to have a claimant prematurely declared MMI (i.e., released from
medical care).

•

Refusal by a surety to authorize the primary treating physician's referral to a separate
medical specialist.

•

Delay by the surety in issuing benefit checks.

•

A subsequent injury or re-injury while the claimant is working light-duty (i.e., prior to
maximum medical improvement).

•

Attempted "IME Shopping," in which a surety sends a claimant to serial independent
medical examiners until it finds one who will give a lower PPI rating.

•

A subsequent decision by a surety to reverse its original acceptance of all or part of a
claim.

•

A subsequent decision by a surety to not accept, or to reverse its original acceptance of,

the claim for a particular injured body part.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022
(208) 345-1000
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•

Dispute between employer and surety as to whether a policy of insurance was in place on
the date of injury .

• ~-Thelllaking-ofa- c1aimforTeimbursement-ofmedicallraveh~xpenses;-pharmacy-charges;---------~----or medical treatment charges.
•

The lay claimant may need help in understanding and complying with the Idaho workers'
compensation process.
Seiniger Law Offices has encountered the above situations in its representation of

claimants. Our representation and advocacy in these situations has made a positive difference for
our clients.
Another example of what a claimant gains by retaining an attorney is that
communications between the surety (or its attorneys) and the claimant are conducted through the
claimant's attorney. Thus, the claimant is protected from making statements or agreements
against interest, signing documents against interest, or being overborne upon by "nurse case
managers" or other agents of the defendants, who may regard unrepresented parties as less likely
to know their rights.
Clearly, the representation and advice given to a claimant by an attorney may be vital to
protecting the claimant's rights. At a minimum, representation is essential to advising a claimant
as to what those rights are.
Denying attorney fees on "uncontested" impairment ratings assigned after counsel has
been retained and is actively representing a claimant is equivalent to an implicit finding that the
attorney was of no value in the particular case, or that an attorney is never of sufficient value to
justify being compensated.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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If the Commission would adopt a procedure whereby a claimant can come to the
Commission within some reasonable number of days before or after the claimant's initial
--~---~-meeting-with~elaimant'-s-attorney~and--obtain~a-guarantee~that-any- benefits-wiB-be~paid-andthat-no-~--~----··-

defenses exist as to those benefits, then a claimant's attorney (despite its constitutional rights as
set forth above) could voluntarily agree not to take an attorney fee on those benefits. Of course,
such a procedure could never be established, because all defenses remain open to defendants in a
workers' compensation case as a matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by
the Commission.
In sum:
•

Injured workers have the right to hire an attorney of their choosing as advocate and
counselor, and to contract to pay the attorney a fee for those services.

•

The attorney has a constitutional right to be paid the contracted fee for providing
the requested services.
Counsel has been informed that on some occasions the Commission has relied on

Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (Idaho 1998), in denying attorney fees on a PPI
award. Mancilla was cited with approval in Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2
P.3d 735 (Idaho 2000), which in tum generally cited other cases such as Rhodes v. Indus.
Comm., 125 Idaho 139,868 P.2d 467 (Idaho 1993).
However, the Mancilla line of cases does not cite Curr, nor do they address the
constitutional holdings of Curr as set forth above. Unless and until such time as the Idaho
Supreme Court explicitly overrules its constitutional holdings in CU", it remains good law.
Specifically, there is nothing in the Mancilla case to the effect that an attorney in a
workers' compensation matter cannot be compensated "for acting solely as a counselor." There
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(208) 345-1000
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is nothing in it to the effect that an attorney cannot be compensated for advocacy efforts "that do
not generate monetary awards." There is nothing in it to the effect that attorney fees are limited
"
" 'T't..
•
thin··
.
.1..
•
• __ 1
----to--new-money-;--1:uel'e-1S-UO
.... g-ill'1t-tO-'the-en:eetuTa:t--an-att{)rneyl.las-nereonstttnttoill1l----------~---~

+t..~.

"property rights under the fee agreement." Accordingly, Mancilla cannot be considered to hav~
overruled Curr on these issues.
Counsel has also been informed that the Commission has recently issued an opinion in
which it cites Mancilla in support of a denial of attorney fees on PPI benefits. In its "Order
Releasing Retained Proceeds" in Sandra Perez v. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and Liberty Northwest

Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757 (2009) (no citation available), the Commission stated in
pertinent part on page 4 that "in order to support an award of fees, it must be sho'wn that
Claimant's entitlement to the funds in question was disputed..." (Emphasis in original.) This
ruling is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's constitutional holding in Curr, but we presume
this is because the constitutional issues were not raised by the parties in Perez. As quoted above,

Curr struck down a provision that "preempts representation other than in disputed matters." 124
Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138. Again, since Curr remains good law, claimants in Idaho are
allowed to obtain legal representation in matters "other than in disputed matters," and attorneys
with whom they contract are constitutionally allowed to be paid.
Put another way, if the ruling in the recent Perez case were to be broadly enforced,
claimants in Idaho would not be able to obtain legal representation until after they had been
evaluated for a PPI rating-unless they could find attorneys who could afford to provide legal
counseling and advocacy services pro bono for the weeks, months, or years preceding a PPI
rating. Counsel respectfully submits that neither the Idaho Legislature nor the Idaho Supreme
Court has ever intended, nor would public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(208) 345-1000
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their constitutional right to seek the advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's
compensation matter.

DISeuSSIONw--.-In the instant case, Seiniger Law Offices, as Counsel for Claimant, provided extensive
legal services from 2007 to the present. Among many other services, these included acting as
"counselor," and making efforts as an advocate for Claimant on issues or concerns that did not
involve "monetary awards." Counsel and Claimant, as was their right, had entered into a fee
agreement that specifically provided for Counsel's compensation to include a percentage of
benefits obtained from a PPI rating given after execution of the agreement.
The services provided by Counsel are set forth in the accompanying Affidavit of Andrew
Marsh and its exhibits. They establish that Counsel provided services of a nature and extent
sufficient to establish Counsel's property rights under Curr for compensation.

Dated July 24, 2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on July 24,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM, together with the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, except for the exhibits to the
~-~-~--afficlavit-(whieh-are-omitted-due-t(J~e-volume-of-pages-butwhleh-wilt~be-pmvicled-up(Jn-request}-~------

to be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
POBox 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426
00 Mail

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
-----Boise,Idaho-83-1{1z--·· -.---....----------Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.e. No. 06-012770
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
And

Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss
)

Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of record

for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. was retained by Claimant in regard to the above matter on or
about 5/30107. A copy of the engagement agreement has been previously provided to the

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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Commission as an attacbment to my Form 1022. The engagement agreement reads in
pertinent part:
AttorneywiUiaIre-a-percentage-of-any-benefits-obtained-by-~

Client with respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating
is given after the parties execute this agreement.

The above clause was in typed in bold in the original. The meaning and import of a
permanent partial impairment rating was explained and discussed with Claimant prior to
execution.
3. In retaining Counsel, Claimant specifically sought the services of Counsel as counselor
and as advocate.
4. At that time of retaining Counsel, Claimant wanted advice and assistance on, inter alia,
what she viewed as efforts by the surety and the doctor to prevent her from receiving
worker's compensation benefits. In a written "Workmen's (sic) Compensation Summary"
provided to Counsel on or about the time Counsel was retained, she stated as follows:
"Dr. Greenwald and Steve Haase want all medical records from Dr. Mayes (Chiropractic)
trying to claim that my injury is 'not' Workmen's Compensation Related. Prior Injury
related."
5. On many occasions, Counsel provided legal counseling and/or legal advocacy on many
topics and issues, including: Claimant's rights under the work comp statutes; the work
comp process and procedure; the medical treatment issues as they related to work comp
law and procedure; maximum medical improvement (MMl) issues; permanent partial
impairment (pPI) issues; permanent work restriction issues; vocational evaluation expert
issues; permanent partial disability (PPD) issues; the right of the employer to terminate

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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her; and the effect of an employer-proposed "Separation Agreement and General
Release" on her rights to worker's compensation benefits.
-~--I6~.-In-representing-Glaimant,this-office-drafted,r-eviewed,analyzed,andJBr-aBted-uJ?0n-the-------

documents attached hereto as Exhibit A. This includes hundred of pages of
correspondence, damages and bills, fee and cost records, Industrial Commission records,
and medical records.
7. In representing Claimant, this office engaged in many phone transactions as listed in
Exhibit B, email transactions as listed in Exhibit C, and meeting and note transactions as
listed in Exhibit D.
8. The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI
benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of
$5438.13, on which attorney fees of$1359.53 were paid (see demand letters to the surety
dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto as Exhibit E and Exhibit F respectively).
FURTIIER SAYETI! YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.

Dated July 24,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

4W~

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on July 24, 2009 .
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

C.L. "BUTCH" OlTER, GOVERNOR

PO Box 83nO
Boise, ID 83 nO-0041
(208) 334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321
1-800-950-2110
~

'-. . - .-. ~ .-

COMMISSIONERS
R.D. Maynard, Chairman
Thomas E. Limbaugh
Thomas P. Baskin

Mindy Montgomery. Director

-------- _ .- .- -.-..--- ------.-'--.---- --- ~----------------.------

September 3, 2009
Andrew Marsh
Seiniger Law Office
942 W Myrtle
Boise, ID 83702
Re:

Claimant: Laurel Kulm
IC #: 2006-012770
Proposed settlement with Indemnity Insurance Company of America

Dear Mr. Marsh:
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement agreement
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12 regarding your representation of
the claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staff has made an initial determination
that the settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested
fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration, which have not
been found to be reasonable per IDAP A 17.02.08.033.
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAP A
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing
available funds, and fees which have been determined to be reasonable.
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement.
Sincerely,

#~

Scott McDougall
Manager, Claims and Benefits

700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boise, ID
Equal Opportunity Employer

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
v.

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Indemnity Insurance Company
Of North America,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC: 2006-012770

ORDER APPROVING IN PART
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT,
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT

FILE D

SEP 0 4 2009
INDUSTRIAl·COMMISSION

This matter came before the Commission on the request of the parties to approve a Lump
Sum Agreement.

The Commission desires to approve the agreement, except for a portion

relating to attorney fees. Having fully reviewed the proposed settlement and being fully advised,
the Commission finds that the agreement is in the best interests of the parties. THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Lump Sum Agreement proposed by the parties is
approved, with the exception of a portion of the claim for attorney fees submitted by Claimant's
attorney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Commission approves the request for attorney fees
and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration.

The total lump sum

consideration amount is $12,223.13. Fees from that amount have been requested at 25%, which
is reasonable.

Fees and costs amount to $3,055.78 and $10.00 respectively, for a total of

$3,065.78. However, Attorney has previously withheld $3,301.72 as fees, un-itemized as to the
specific benefits obtained other than "Benefits, paid prior to Lump Sum ... " Such fees have not
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been substantiated to the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.
Thus, no fee proceeds from the settlement shall be made payable to Attorney. Surety will release
to Attorney $10.00 for costs. Further, inasmuch as the fees previously taken exceed by $245.94
those fees found reasonable, Claimant's attorney shall reimburse the trust account for this
claimant the amount of$245.94.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $3,250.00,
which is the balance of the amount of the proceeds of the Lump Sum Agreement requested for
unsubstantiated attorney fees. This amount shall be held in trust by Attorney pending further
order of the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety pay to Claimant the remaining sum of
$9,740.00.
Claimant's attorney previously been advised in writing of this determination and his right
to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees.
DATED this L.f!,day of

SepieMW ,2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ~ ~ ,J&) 9 , a true and correct copy of ORDER
APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP
SUM SETTLEMENT, regarding IC # 2006-012770, was served upon the parties listed below
as follows:

-x-US MAIL

COURIER

Andrew Marsh
942 WMyrtle
Boise, ID 83702

Kate Beaudreau
ICM, Inc
1150 W State, #330
Boise, ID 83702

Alan K. Hull
Anderson, Julian & Hull
th
250 South 5 , #700
PO Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

TRt

C:\VEO

,

COr1r1iSS10N

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770

vs.
Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
And

Industrial Claims Management,

MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE
ORDER APPROVING IN PART
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT,
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT;
AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION

Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel, pursuant to I.C. 72-718 and lRP. 3 (F), and hereby
moves the Commission to Reconsider its ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION
AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT filed September 4, 2009
(hereinafter "ORDER") (attached hereto as Exhibit A) and also hereby files Counsel's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion.
The grounds for this motion are, in regard to the finding in the ORDER that requested
attorney fees were not reasonable, as follows:
1. The ORDER has no basis in fact or in law.
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2. The ORDER is internally inconsistent, with said inconsistencies being irreconcilable, in
that it finds attorney fees on some permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits to be
reasonable, and attorney fees on other PPD benefits to be unreasonable, even though the
factual basis for both sets of PPDs is one and the same.
3. The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel as set forth in Curr v. Curr,
124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993).
4. The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Claimant who, having engaged legal
counsel and having contracted for payment of counsel, has the right to have said contract
honored.
5. The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel to Equal Protection, in that it
applies a separate and unequal standard for determining the reasonableness of fees for the
legal profession and the medical profession in their provisions of services to claimants.
6. The ORDER fails to provide reasonable notice to Counsel of the factual and legal basis
for denying attorney fees to Counsel, in that the Commission failed to make findings of
fact and conclusions oflaw in its ORDER, even though these are required for proper
review of an order by the Idaho Supreme Court, and in that the Commission failed to
comply with its own regulations requiring Counsel to be provided notification "in
writing" of "the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as
required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a.
7. The Commission's interpretation and application of its ID APA rules in this case has led
to results that are contrary to the legislative intent of "sure and certain relief for injured
'workmen" (l.e. 72-201) in enacting the worker's compensation law; contrary to the
delegation of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and regulations
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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for effecting the purposes of this act;" contrary to public policy that favors ensuring that
claimants have access to counsel; and contrary to public policy in that it is likely to
damage the attorney-client relationship.

The facts supporting this Motion are set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached
hereto as Exhibit B.
The relief sought by this Motion is for the ORDER to be amended to approve in full the
"Stipulation and Agreement and Release and Lump Sum Settlement" that was the subject matter
of the original ORDER., including approval of Counsel's attorney fees as set forth in said Lump
Sum Settlement Agreement.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

INTRODUCTION
Claimant was injured in the workplace and solicited and contracted the services of
Counsel, who provided lawful services as counselor and advocate. In that capacity, Counsel
ultimately negotiated a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA), which was submitted to the
Commission for approval in May, 2009. The Commission issued its ORDER on September 4,
2009, in which it approved the LSSA as between Claimant and Defendants, but ruled that
Counsel's claims for attorney fees were unreasonable in part. The Commission offered no
explanation for its ruling. Counsel maintains that he is constitutionally and legally entitled to his
attorney fees in full, and that Cla.i!J-lant is

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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to have her fee

contra~t

with Counsel honored.
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FACTS
COUNSEL'S ACTIONS HAVE BEEN REASONABLE
In the representation of Claimant, including Counsel's claims for attorney fees, Counsel
was in full compliance with his legal, professional, and ethical obligations, all as set forth in the
Idaho Constitution, Idaho statutes, Idaho rules, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
including Rule 1.5 regarding attorney fees. Counsel was also in full compliance with Counsel's
legal, professional, and ethical obligations under the fee and engagement contract executed by
Claimant for Counsel's services. See Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, attached to the foregoing
Motion as Exhibit B.
In sum, Counsel has acted reasonably and has met all Constitutional and legal
requirements for receiving his attorney fees.

THE COMMISSION HAS RULED THAT COUNSEL ACTED
UNREASONABLY, BUT GAVE NO REASONS FOR SO RULING
On September 4,2009, the Commission issued its order titled ORDER APPROVING IN
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
(hereinafter "ORDER"). The ORDER states that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
The ORDER also states that "Claimant's attorney [has] previously been advised in
writing of this determination and his right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees," an
apparent reference to a letter to Counsel dated 9/3/09 from Scott McDougal, Manager of the
Claims and ffenefits-&ttiOIi oftl1e Commjssiorr(attaclled tD the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh).
The letter states that a "portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the
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$12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA
17.02.08.033."
Although IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a requires that Counsel be notified "in writing" of
''the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," the letter from Mr.
McDougal does not list any reasons, nor does the ORDER itself.

In sum, the Commission has already ruled that Counsel acted unreasonably, but has not
notified Counsel of the legal or factual basis for its ruling, and has failed to comply with its own
regulations requiring the giving of notice.

ISSUES AND DISCUSSION
THE ORDER HAS NO BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW
As set forth above, there are no facts that would support the ORDER's ruling that a
portion of attorney fees claimed was unreasonable. In addition, Counsel knows of no
constitutional or legal basis for denying attorney fees, and the Commission has not offered any.
It is self-evident that an order from a tribunal has to have a basis in fact and in law.

THE ORDER IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT
The ORDER is internally inconsistent, with said inconsistencies being irreconcilable, in
that it finds attorney fees on some permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits to be reasonable,
and attorney fees on other PPD benefits to be unreasonable, even though the factual basis for
both sets of PPDs is one and the same.
~ l'(H-eGap,the~Lump-SumSettlementAgreement

(LSSA} provldes-IoI benefits for ~

Permanent Partial Disability of $6215.00 and Lump Sum Consideration of $12,223.13 for
"decreased wage earning capacity, non-medical factors and permanent partial disability, if any."
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See Page 5 of the LSSA and also the chart titled "Kulm Benefits and Fees," both attached to the
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
The ORDER does not allow Counsel to receive attorney fees on the permanent partial
disability that is contained in the line item of the $6215.00 (hereinafter "Unreasonable PPD"),
but it does allow fees on the permanent partial disability that is contained in the line item of the
$12,223.13 (hereinafter "Reasonable PPD"). In other words, the Commission ruled that it was
reasonable for Counsel to claim attorney fees on some portions of the permanent partial disability
benefits but not on others. The ORDER gives no clue for the differing treatment.
This ruling was made despite the fact that there is no dispute that all PPD benefits were
obtained as a direct result of Counsel obtaining a vocational evaluation report from Dr. Mary
Barros-Bailey (attached to the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh) and sending her findings of disability
beyond impairment to the surety along with a demand for PPD benefits. (See demand letters to
the surety dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached to the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh.) After
receiving the demand, the surety ultimately began making PPD payments (see check no.
1164166 from surety dated 10/16/08, attached to the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh), many months
before settlement was reached.
The attorney's fee ruled to be unreasonable totals $3,301.72, which amount was
\

itemized l in the AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM

\
\
\

\
\

OF LAW filed with the Commission on July 24, 2009, in paragraph 8 (attached to the Affidavit

\

\

I

-

of Andrew Marsh which is attached hereto as Exhibit B): "The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum
Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of

...-'

1 Inexplicably,

the ORDER on page 1 characterizes the $3,301.72 as "un-itemized" by Counsel.
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$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of$5438.13, on which attorney fees of$1359.53 were
paid (see demand letters to the surety dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto as Exhibit[sD."
Counsel can hazard no guess as to why the Commission ruled that it was not reasonable
to claim attorney fees on some PPD benefits but not others, given that both the "Unreasonable
PPD" and the "Reasonable PPD" resulted from the exact same advocacy efforts of CounseL
One might argue that the Commission simply made a mistake--that it got confused and
assumed that all of the $3,301.72 in unreasonable fees was on the permanent partial impairment
benefits, when in fact only $1942.19 in fees was claimed on PPI. Counsel considers the mistake
theory to be unlikely for these reasons:
•

The Commission was aware that the PPI rating was only 5%; that this percentage
translated to benefits of$7,768.75; and that a claim of $3,301.72 on that amount
would equal an attorney's fee of a whopping 42.5%.

•

The Commission had received on July 24, 2009 the above-referenced AFFIDAVIT
OF ANDREW C. MARSH, which contained the above-referenced itemization in
paragraph 8, and which contained exhibits of the demand letters for PPD benefits that
resulted in the surety starting to pay PPD benefits many months before a settlement
agreement was even reached.

•

The Commission's ORDER says it issued the order only after "Having fully reviewed
the proposed settlement and being fully advised."

"considered your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12."
Clearly, then, it was no mistake that the Commission ruled that an attorney fee claim on
some of the PPD benefits was reasonable and some of it was unreasonable. In other words, the
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
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Commission's ruling was made knowingly and purposefully. It is self-evident that since the
ORDER is prima facie internally inconsistent, the Commission should reconsider its ruling.

THE ORDER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
COUNSEL UNDER CURR
The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel as set forth in Curr v. Curr,
124 Idaho 686,864 P.2d 132 (1993).
The law governing the constitutional right of an attorney to be paid an attorney's fee was
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Curr as follows:
... the Commission's current stance, as Seiniger aptly points out, fails to
compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and fails to recognize
efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for
medical care or procuring an impairment rating. Moreover, the Commission's
arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients,
thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new
money" provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters
once again contravening I.e. § 72-508. The net result ... is a deprivation of
appellants' property rights under the fee agreement without due process of law.
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692,864 P.2d 132, 138 (Idaho 1993). (bold
emphasis added)

First, the Court found that an attorney has a constitutional right to be paid for services

rendered on the whole case, including services rendered as counselor and advocate.
Second, the Court found that payment of attorney fees cannot be limited to the basis of

"new money," because that would prevent claimants from receiving legal representation and
counseling except in "disputed matters." In other words, attorneys would be forced to decline
~ ~ r~epr~entatiQnj!1<::asy~~ \Vh~re

at l~as! s91Ile~ (b!!t}!ot nece~sarily all} ~>fft1e benefi~ ~ li!cely be
--

~

paid.
The reasoning for the Court's holding is obvious: When a potential client first consults an
attorney, it is never clear what benefits, if any, the claimant will ultimately actually be paid. In
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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fact, Curr also holds that "Reasonableness [of a fee agreement] ... derives from the totality of
the circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was
made." Id at 136, 690. In other words, if at the time of contracting for an attorney the contracting
parties had reasonable concerns that advocacy might be needed to address existing or potential
disputes, the benefit of hindsight may not be used for a finding that it was unreasonable to so
contract.
Even in a case wherein the claim appears to have been "accepted,,2 by the surety, many
defenses can be raised by the employer/surety during the course of representation, negotiations,
or litigation, including the following:
•

Apportionment for alleged "pre-existing conditions," which allegation can be used by
defendants to reduce a permanent partial impairment benefit.

•

Alleging that claimant "failed to cooperate" with medical providers or treatment.

•

Alleging that claimant "quit his job" during a period in which the claimant was released
for light-duty work.

•

Alleging that claimant ''was terminated for cause" during a period in which the claimant
was released for light-duty work.
There are other circumstances in which a claimant may need the services of an advocate

or litigator in an undisputed-injury case:
•

Refusal by a surety to authorize recommended medical treatment.

•

Ef!ort:s_~La_~urety ~o haye a claimant prematurely declared MMI (i.e., released from
medical care).

Note that it can be almost impossible to prove that a claim was denied. The clever employer can merely answer the
complaint with ''under investigation," allows months to go by in which it ignores demands to begin paying benefits,
then when claimant moves to compel payment, the employer can respond that it never put in writing that the claim
was denied and that therefore it never did deny the claim-it was always just ''under investigation."
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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•

Refusal by a surety to authorize the primary treating physician's referral to a separate
medical specialist.

•

Delay by the surety in issuing benefit checks.

•

A subsequent injury or re-injury while the claimant is working light-duty (i.e., prior to
maximum medical improvement).

•

Attempted "IME Shopping," in which a surety sends a claimant to serial independent
medical examiners until it finds one who will give a lower PPI rating.

•

A subsequent decision by a surety to reverse its original acceptance of all or part of a
claim.

•

A subsequent decision by a surety to not accept, or to reverse its original acceptance of,
the claim for a particular injured body part.

•

Dispute between employer and surety as to whether a policy of insurance was in place on
the date of injury.

•

The making of a claim for reimbursement of medical travel expenses, pharmacy charges,
or medical treatment charges.

•

The lay claimant may need help in understanding and complying with the Idaho workers'
compensation process.
Another example of what a claimant gains by retaining an attorney is that

communications between the surety (or its attorneys) and the claimant are conducted through the
claimant's attorney_ Thus,_ the_ claimant is pro1ected from making statements or agreements
against interest, signing documents against interest, or being overborne upon by "nurse case
managers" or other agents of the defendants, who may regard unrepresented parties as less likely
to know their rights.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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Clearly, the representation and advice given to a claimant by an attorney may be vital to
protecting the claimant's rights. At a minimum, representation is essential to advising a claimant
as to what those rights are.
Denying attorney fees on ''uncontested'' impairment ratings assigned after counsel has
been retained and is actively representing a claimant is equivalent to an implicit finding that the
attorney was of no value in the particular case, or that an attorney is never of sufficient value to
justify being compensated.
In sum, the attorney has a constitutional right to be paid the contracted fee for
providing the requested services.
Counsel has been informed that on some occasions the Commission has relied on

Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (Idaho 1998), in denying attorney fees on a PPI
award. Mancilla was cited with approval in Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2
P.3d 735 (Idaho 2000), which in turn generally cited other cases such as Rhodes v. Indus.

Comm., 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (Idaho 1993).
However, the Mancilla line of cases does not cite Curr, nor do they address the
constitutional holdings of Curr as set forth above. Unless and until such time as the Idaho
Supreme Court explicitly overrules its constitutional holdings in Curr, it remains good law.
Specifically, there is nothing in the Mancilla case to the effect that an attorney in a
workers' compensation matter cannot be compensated "for acting solely as a counselor." There
is nothing in it to the effect that an attorney cannot be compensated for advocacy efforts "that do
not generate monetary awards." There is nothing in it to the effect that attorney fees are limited
to "new money." There is nothing in it to the effect that an attorney has no constitutional
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"property rights under the fee agreement." Accordingly, Mancilla cannot be considered to have
overruled Curr on these issues.
Counsel has also been informed that the Commission has recently issued an opinion in
which it cites Mancilla in support of a denial of attorney fees on PPI benefits. In its "Order
Releasing Retained Proceeds" in Sandra Perez v. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and Liberty Northwest
Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757 (2009) (no citation available), the Commission stated in
pertinent part on page 4 that "in order to support an award of fees, it must be shown that
Claimant's entitlement to the funds in question was disputed... " (Emphasis in original.) But as
quoted above, Curr struck down a provision that "preempts representation other than in disputed
matters." 124 Idaho 686, 692,864 P.2d 132, 138. Again, since Curr remains good law, claimants
in Idaho are allowed to obtain legal representation in matters "other than in disputed matters,"
and attorneys with whom they contract are constitutionally allowed to be paid. 3

THE ORDER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
CLAIMANT
The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Claimant who, having engaged legal
counsel and contracted for payment of Counsel, has the right to have said contract honored. Put
another way, injured workers have the right to hire an attorney of their choosing as advocate and
counselor, and to contract to pay the attorney a fee for those services.
The Curr case also stated:
An attorney fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho law, and
appellants performed services for their clients in reliance on the terms of the fee
agreements. -It IS crear that, in Idaho, partIes to a contract have Ii Property interest
in the subject matter of the contract that is protectable**138 *692 both under the
3 If the ruling in the recent Perez case were to be broadly enforced, claimants in Idaho would not be able to obtain
legal representation until after they had been evaluated for a PPI rating-unless they could find attorneys who could
afford to provide legal counseling and advocacy services pro bono for the weeks, months, or years preceding a PPI
rating.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.
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Contract Clause ... and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
[citations omitted] ... In addition, the right to follow a recognized and useful
occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13.
[citations omitted] 124 Idaho 686,691,864 P.2d 132, 137.
In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public
welfare, the Commission must afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e.,
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time [citation omitted] 124
Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138. (emphasis added)

It is notable that the Court refers to contracting "parties" in the plural sense, indicating

that both parties to an attorney fee contract have constitutional and property rights in seeing the
contract enforced. In other words, the claimant has just as much right as the attorney does to
have the fee contract enforced.
Moreover, the language used indicates that the "due process" requirement applies to both
parties, meaning that the Claimant, too, should have notice and an opportunity to be heard on
whether she wishes the contract to be enforced on its terms. The ORDER was entered without
any such notice to the Claimant and opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the ORDER violates
the Constitutional rights of Claimant, and should be reconsidered.

THE ORDER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
COUNSEL TO EQUAL PROTECTION
The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel to Equal Protection, U.S.
Constitution, 14th Amendment, in that in denying attorney fees, it applies a separate and unequal
standard for determining the reasonableness of fees for the legal profession and the medical
-

~

-

-

profession in their provisions of services to claimants.
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii requires attorneys to prove, inter alia, that their services
"operated primarily or substantially" to obtain the desired result for claimants (worker'S
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compensation benefits). But there is nothing in IDAPA 17.02.08.031 or elsewhere that requires
medical providers to prove that their services "operated primarily or substantially" to obtain the
desired result for claimant (medical recovery). Nor are medical providers required to prove that
the claimant would not have recovered medically if the provider had not offered services.
Counsel is aware of no authority to support the Commission's position that the legal
profession and the medical profession should be subject to different, and arbitrary, standards for
determining whether they should be paid for their provisions of services to claimants. This is a

primafacie violation of Equal Protection under the law.

THE ORDER FAILS TO PROVIDE REASONABLE NOTICE TO
COUNSEL OF THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR ITS RULING,
AND THE COMMISSION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ITS OWN
RULES REQUIRING NOTIFICATION OF REASONS FOR ITS
FINDINGS
The ORDER fails to provide reasonable notice to Counsel of the factual and legal basis
for denying attorney fees to Counsel. The Idaho Supreme in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864
P.2d 132 (1993) has stated as follows:
To properly review an order of the Commission under the appropriate standard of
review, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon reviewable
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Iverson v. Farming, 103 Idaho 527, 530,
650 P.2d 669, 672 (1982) ... Curr, 124 Idaho at 136, 864 P.2d at 690.
Findings which are created after a decision has been made and entered are not the
"findings" contemplated by our decisions ... Curr, 124 Idaho at 137, 864 P.2d at
691.

In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public
welfare, the-Commission must-afford -due process-to the contracting parties, i.e.,
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. The notice requirement mandates meaningful
notification of the regulations to be imposed. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105
S.Ct. at 1495. This means, at a minimum, that the Commission must give notice
of the purpose of the hearing, must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards
that will be used at the hearing, assign the burden of proof and level of proof, and
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. PA
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formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the fee modifications in
order to eliminate any latent arbitrariness. The "meaningful hearing" component
of the due process requirement insures the attorney the opportunity to influence
the discretion of the decision-maker by presenting his or her reasons "why the
proposed action should not be taken" before the Commission makes the decision
to modify the fee agreement. Id See also, Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 854
P.2d 242 (1993). (emphasis in original) Curr, 124 Idaho at 138, 864 P.2d at 692.
The above language, and the import of the Curr decision as a whole, makes clear the
Court's position that notice, findings of fact, and conclusions of law are essential to fundamental
fairness in making attorney fee rulings.

In addition, Counsel never received any notification "in writing" of ''the reasons for the
determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," even though this is required by IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03.a.
Clearly, both the due-process notice requirements and IDAPA notice requirements have
not been met. Accordingly, the ORDER should be reconsidered.
Counsel anticipates the argument that the notice requirements set forth above are not
necessary, because Counsel may move for a hearing pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.b
(hereinafter "Hearing"), and the burden of proof is on Counsel to prove at the Hearing that he
acted reasonably, pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.d.4 However, the Commission has already

ruled that Counsel's claims are unreasonable. So in reality, the purpose of any Hearing is to
address the findings of unreasonableness that the Commission has already made. But how can
Counsel address these findings ifhe doesn't have notice ofwhat they are?
To illustrate, let us consider this example: A Doctor begins treating a Patient in May
2007, finishes the treatment two years later, and turns in his bill to the Insurance Adjuster
responsible for paying it. The Adjuster decides that it finds the Doctor's bill to be unreasonable,
"The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his or her assertion of a
charging lien and reasonableness ofhis or her fee." IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.03.d.

4
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and sends him a letter that says the Adjuster has already made up its mind against him. "I won't
tell you in what respect your bill is unreasonable," the Adjuster says to the Doctor. "However, I
will hold a meeting at which you can try to guess what I think you did wrong. If you can
correctly guess what facts I relied on in previously making up my mind against you, and what
law or constitutional principles I applied to those facts in making up my mind, and if you can
also guess what proof I'd like to see before considering whether to change my mind, and if you
can have had the prescience to have brought your proof to the meeting, then I'll be glad to hear
you out. But be forewarned, the burden is on you to change my mind, and if you guess wrong,
then I won't allow you to get paid for the work you did."
Most people would agree that this approach does not seem fair to the Doctor.
Let us continue the illustration. The Adjuster next says, "I'm not a doctor myself, but I
think the Patient would have gotten well even if you hadn't helped him. So when we have our
little meeting, you'll also have to prove that the Patient would not have gotten well without your
help."
Finally, the Adjuster says, "Keep in mind that it doesn't matter to me that the Patient got
well, and that the Patient appreciates your efforts to cure him, and that the Patient agreed in
advance to pay you, and that the Patient wants you to be paid for curing him."
As this illustration shows, it is patently unfair to expect Counsel to put on proof to
countermand the ruling that the Commission has already made against him, without Counsel
having any notice as to the factual or legal basis for that ruling. 5

5 Note that IDAPA Rule 17.02.08.033.03.b does nothing more than allow the Commission to change its ruling after
a Hearing. Note also that in terms offairness, this Hearing procedure is to be distinguished from a process in which
a tnbunal (that has not yet made a ruling) holds a hearing, takes evidence from all interested parties, quizzes the
parties on their application of the law to the evidence, allows the parties to submit post-hearing briefs on the issues
raised by the tribunal, and subsequently makes a ruling.
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THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ITS
IDAPA RULES IS CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND
PUBLIC POLICY
The Commission's interpretation and application of its IDAPA rules in this case has led
to results that are contrary to the legislative intent of "sure and certain relief for injured
workmen" (I.C. 72-201) in enacting the worker's compensation law, and contrary to the
delegation of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and regulations for
effecting the purposes of this act."
The Commission's action in this case is also contrary to public policy in that it is likely to
damage the attorney-client relationship 6, and contrary to public policy that favors ensuring that
claimants have access to counsee.
Counsel submits that neither the Idaho Legislature nor the Idaho Supreme Court has ever
intended, nor would public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of their constitutional
right to seek the advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's compensation
matter.
Moreover, injured workers who do not receive their full medical and income benefits
due to lack of access to legal counsel do not just disappear; they still need help, so they surface at
emergency rooms for medical care and welfare departments for income problems. The net cost to
society is same-it is just that the cost of caring for injured workers is shifted from insurance
companies who are protected from having to pay on policy claims (even though they collected
premiums) to other governmental and charitable institutions. This shifting of the cost is also
counter to public policy.
the Commission's arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients, thereby
seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship ..." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,692,864 P.2d 132, 138
7 The Curr Court noted that "two general philosophies for the Commission to consider" are to "encourage claimants
to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to take on such claimants' interests. Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17,684
P.2d at 994." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,693,864 Pold 132, 139
6 " •••
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the ORDER should be amended to approve inJull the
"Stipulation and Agreement and Release and Lump Sum Settlement" that was the subject matter
of the original ORDER, including approval of Counsel's attorney fees as set forth in said Lump
Sum Settlement Agreement.

Dated September 18, 2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on September 18,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
PO Box 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510

IElFax
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P .A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL CO:MMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770
vs.

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
And

Industrial Claims Management,

MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
IN REGARD TO THE ORDER
APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION
AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT;
AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION

Surety,
Defendants.

COJ\.1ES NOW Claimant's Counsel, and hereby moves the Commission to issue Findings
and Fact and Conclusions of Law in regard to its ORDER APPROVING IN PART
STIPULATION AND AGREEJ\.1ENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEJ\.1ENT filed
September 4,2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"), and also hereby files Counsel's Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion.
The basis for this motion is that Counsel is not aware of any facts, any documents, or any
witness testimony that would support a finding that Counsel's fees were unreasonable, as set
forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached hereto as Exhibit A. In addition, Counsel is not
aware of any Constitutional or statutory basis that would support a finding that Counsel's fees
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were unreasonable. In addition, Counsel never received any notification "in writing" of "the
reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as required by IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03.a.

In order for Counsel to prepare for a hearing on the ORDER (a motion for which is being
separately filed with the Commission), Counsel must have notice of what facts the Commission
relied upon in making its determination of unreasonableness; what facts are at issue; what
documents to offer into evidence; what witnesses to call to testify; what law the Commission
applied to said facts; and what conclusions of law the Commission made. Otherwise, Counsel is
unable to prepare the factual and legal elements necessary to have a fair opportunity to be heard
at a hearing on the ORDER.
The relief sought is the issuance by the Commission of findings of fact and conclusions
of law as described herein.

:MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

FACTS
COUNSEL'S ACTIONS HAVE BEEN REASONABLE
Counsel represented Claimant in the above-captioned matter. In the representation,
including Counsel's claims for attorney fees, Counsel was in full compliance with his legal,
professional, and ethical obligations, all as set forth in the Idaho Constitution, Idaho statutes,
Idaho rules, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct including Rule 1.5 regarding attorney
fees. Counsel was also in full compliance with Counsel's legal, professional, and ethical
obligations under the fee and engagement contract executed by Claimant for Counsel's services.
See Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, attached to the foregoing Motion as Exhibit A.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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In sum, Counsel has not committed any acts or omissions that were unreasonable.

THE COMMISSION HAS RULED THAT COUNSEL ACTED
UNREASONABLY
On September 4, 2009, the Commission issued its order titled ORDER APPROVING IN
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
(hereinafter "ORDER"). The ORDER states that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
The ORDER also states that "Claimant's attorney [has] previously been advised in
writing of this determination and his right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees," an
apparent reference to a letter to Counsel dated 9/3/09 from Scott McDougal, Manager of the
Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission (attached hereto as Exhibit B). The letter states
that a "portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
In sum, the Commission has already ruled that Counsel acted unreasonably.

ISSUES AND DISCUSSION
DOES THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
REQUIRE THAT COUNSEL HAVE NOTICE OF THE FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELIED UPON BY THE COMMISSION?
Having received the ORDER, Counsel is filing (under separate cover) a motion for a
hearing on said ORDER pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b (hereinafter "Hearing").
In terms of preparing for the Hearing, Counsel is unable to determine what witnesses to

call and what evidence to introduce, because Counsel has not acted unreasonably and is not
aware of any facts that suggest otherwise. Counsel is also unable to prepare an effective
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Memorandum of Law in anticipation of the Hearing, because Counsel is not aware of any
Constitutional or statutory basis for the Commission's findings in the ORDER.l
Accordingly, it is clear that fundamental fairness requires that Counsel be informed by
the tribunal, in advance of the Hearing, what facts and what law the tribunal relied upon in
finding that Counsel acted unreasonably, so that Counsel may address these issues at the
Hearing.
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,864 P.2d 132 (1993) has
stated as follows:
To properly review an order of the Commission under the appropriate standard of
review, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon reviewable
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Iverson v. Farming, 103 Idaho 527, 530,
650 P.2d 669,672 (1982) ... Curr, 124 Idaho at 136, 864 P.2d at 690.
Findings which are created after a decision has been made and entered are not the
"findings" contemplated by our decisions... Curr, 124 Idaho at 137, 864 P.2d at
691.

In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public
welfare, the Commission must afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e.,
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. The notice requirement mandates meaningful
notification of the regulations to be imposed. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105
S.Ct. at 1495. This means, at a mjnjmum, that the Commission must give notice
of the purpose of the hearing, must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards
that will be used at the hearing, assign the burden of proof and level of proof, and
formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the fee modifications in
order to eliminate any latent arbitrariness. The "meaningful hearing" component
of the due process requirement insures the attorney the opportunity to influence
the discretion of the decision-maker by presenting his or her reasons ''why the
proposed action should not be taken" before the Commission makes the decision
to modify the fee agreement. Id. See also, Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 854
P.2d 242 (1993). (emphasis in original) Curr, 124 Idaho at 138, 864 P.2d at 692.

1 As noted above, Counsel never received any notification "in writing" of "the reasons for the determination that the
requested fee is not reasonable," even though this is required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a.
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The above language, and the import of the Curr decision as a whole, makes clear the
Court's position that notice, an opportunity to be heard, findings of fact, and conclusions of law
are essential to constitutional compliance and fundamental fairness in making attorney fee
rulings.
Counsel anticipates the argument that the burden of proof is on Counsel to prove at the
Hearing that he acted reasonably, pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.d? However, the
Commission has already ruled that Counsel's claims are unreasonable. So in reality, the purpose
of this Hearing is to address the findings of unreasonableness that the Commission has already

made. But how can Counsel address these findings ifhe doesn't know what they are?
To illustrate, let us consider this example: A Doctor begins treating a Patient in May
2007, finishes the treatment two years later, and turns in his bill to the Insurance Adjuster
responsible for paying it. The Adjuster decides that it finds the Doctor's bill to be unreasonable,
and sends him a letter that says the Adjuster has already made up its mind against him. "I won't

tell you in what respect your bill is unreasonable," the Adjuster says to the Doctor. "However, 1
will hold a meeting at which you can try to guess what 1 think you did wrong. If you can
correctly guess what facts 1 relied on in previously making up my mind against you, and what
law or constitutional principles 1 applied to those facts in making up my mind, and if you can
also guess what proof I'd like to see before considering whether to change my mind, and if you
can have had the prescience to have brought your proof to the meeting, then I'll be glad to hear
you out. But be forewarned, the burden is on you to change my mind, and if you guess wrong,
then 1 won't allow you to get paid for the work you did."
Most people would agree that this approach does not seem fair to the Doctor.
2 "The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his or her assertion of a
charging lien and reasonableness ofhis or her fee." IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.03.d
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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Let us continue the illustration. The Adjuster next says, "I'm not a doctor myself, but I
think the Patient would have gotten well even if you hadn't helped him. So when we have our
little meeting, you'll also have to prove that the Patient would not have gotten well without your
help."
Finally, the Adjuster says, "Keep in mind that it doesn't matter to me that the Patient got
well, and that the Patient appreciates your efforts to cure him, and that the Patient agreed in
advance to pay you, and that the Patient wants you to be paid for curing him."
As this illustration shows, it would be patently unfair to expect Counsel to put on proof to
countermand the ruling that the Commission has already made against him, without Counsel
having any information as to the factual or legal basis for that ruling. 3

WHEN AN ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS PRIMA FACIE
INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT, DOES FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
REQUIRE THAT COUNSEL HAVE NOTICE OF THE FACTS AND LAW
RELIED UPON BY THE COMMISSION?
To recap, the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) provides for benefits for
Permanent Partial Disability of$6215.00 and Lump Sum Consideration of$12,223.13 for
"decreased wage earning capacity, non-medical factors and permanent partial disability, if any."

See Page 5 of the LSSA, which is attached to the ORDER. See also the chart titled "Kulm
Benefits and Fees," attached hereto as Exhibit C.
The ORDER does not allow Counsel to receive attorney fees on the permanent partial
disability that is contained in the line item of the $6215.00 (hereinafter "Unreasonable PPD"),
but it does allow fees on the permanent partial disability that is contained in the line item of the
3 Note that IDAPA Rule 17.02.08.033.03.b does nothing more than allow the Commission to change its ruling after
a Hearing. Note also that in terms of fairness, this Hearing procedure is to be distinguished from a process in which
a tribunal (that has not yet made a ruling) holds a hearing, takes evidence from all interested parties, quizzes the
parties on their application of the law to the evidence, allows the parties to submit post-hearing briefs on the issues
raised by the tribunal, and subsequently makes a ruling.
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$12,223.13 (hereinafter "Reasonable PPD"). In other words, the Commission ruled that it was
reasonable for Counsel to claim attorney fees on some portions of the permanent partial disability
benefits but not on others. The ORDER gives no clue for the differing treatment.
This ruling was made despite the fact that there is no dispute that all PPD benefits were
obtained as a direct result of Counsel obtaining a vocational evaluation report from Dr. Mary
Barros-Bailey and sending her findings of disability beyond impairment to the surety along with
a demand for PPD benefits. After receiving the demand, the surety ultimately began making PPD
payments, months before settlement was reached.
The attorney's fee ruled to be unreasonable totals $3,301.72, which amount was
itemized4 in the AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM
OF LAW filed with the Commission on July 24,2009, in paragraph 8: "The benefits paid prior
to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI benefits of $7768.75, on which
attorney fees of$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of $5438.13, on which attorney fees of
$1359.53 were paid (see demand letters to the surety dated 9118/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto
as Exhibit[sD."

Counsel can hazard no guess as to why the Commission ruled that it was not reasonable
to claim attorney fees on some PPD benefits but not others, given that both the "Unreasonable
PPD" and the "Reasonable PPD" resulted from the exact same advocacy efforts of Counsel.
One might argue that the Commission simply made a mistake-that it got confused and
assumed that all of the $3,301.72 in unreasonable fees was on the permanent partial impairment
benefits, when in fact only $1942.19 in fees was claimed on PPI. Counsel considers the mistake
theory to be unlikely for these reasons:

4

Inexplicably, the ORDER on page 1 characterizes the $3,301.72 as ''un-itemized'' by Counsel.
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•

The Commission was aware that the PPI rating was only 5%; that this percentage
translated to benefits of $7,768.75; and that a claim of$3,301.72 on that amount
would equal an attorney's fee ofa whopping 42.5%.

•

The Commission had received on July 24, 2009 the above-referenced AFFIDAVIT
OF ANDREW C. MARSH, which contained the above-referenced itemization in
paragraph 8, and which contained exhibits of the demand letters for PPD benefits that
resulted in the surety starting to pay PPD benefits many months before a settlement
agreement was even reached.

•

The Commission's ORDER says it issued the order only after "Having fully reviewed
the proposed settlement and being fully advised."

•

The above-referenced letter from Mr. McDougal emphasizes that the Commission
"considered your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12."

Clearly, then, it was no mistake that the Commission ruled that an attorney fee claim on
some of the PPD benefits was reasonable and some of it was unreasonable. In other words, the
Commission's ruling was made knowingly and purposefully, and had to have been based on
some fact or some aspect of law. In order for Counsel to address at Hearing the differing bases
for the PPD ruling, Counsel would need to be informed what those bases were.

In sum, it would be patently unfair to expect Counsel to put on proof to countermand the
ruling that the Commission has already made as to PPD claims, without Counsel having any
information as to the factual or legal basis for that ruling.

CONCLUSION
The Commission and Mr. McDougal have acknowledged in writing that they have
received and reviewed the evidence of the services that Counsel performed for Claimant, the
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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contractual basis for so performing, and the hundreds of pages of exhibits that further evidence
those services. The situation can be summarized thusly:
•

Counsel has already placed on file with the Commission overwhelming evidence as to
legal work performed, and believes he has met his burden of proof of the reasonableness
of his claims for attorney fees.

•

The Commission has already reviewed that evidence, and has already ruled that the
attorney fees were unreasonable.

•

Counsel needs to know the [mdings of fact and conclusions of law relied upon by the
Commission in making the rulings contained in its ORDER, so that it may address these
at the Hearing (which is expected to be held pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b.).

•

At the Hearing, Counsel needs to make a record of the facts relied upon by the
Commission for its ORDER, for purposes of preserving its rights to appeal.

•

At the Hearing, Counsel needs to make a record of the conclusions oflaw reached by the
Commission for its ORDER, for purposes of preserving its rights to appeal.
Without a full and fair opportunity to make a record at the Hearing, Counsel will be

irreparably prejudiced in any appeal. The Commission should enter findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw as to its ORDER so that Counsel will have a fair opportunity to challenge
these at the Hearing and to make a record for appeal.

Dated September 18,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
.l
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Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on September 18, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
PO Box 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510
[8] Fax
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Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770

vs.
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss
)

Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of

record for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2.

I have represented Claimant in the above matter since on or about 5/30/2007.

3.

I have received and reviewed the Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN PART

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT filed
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN
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September 4, 2009 in the above-captioned matter (hereinafter "ORDER"), including the
Commission's findings in said ORDER that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to the
Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
4.

I have received and reviewed a letter dated 9/3/09 from Scott McDougal,

Manager of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033." Said letter
does not set forth "the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as
required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a.
5.

In my representation of Claimant, including my claims for attorney fees, I have

been in full compliance with my legal, professional, and ethical obligations, all as set forth in the
Idaho Constitution, Idaho statutes, Idaho rules, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
including Rule 1.5 regarding attorney fees.
6.

In my representation of Claimant, including my claims for attorney fees, I have

been in full compliance with my legal, professional, and ethical obligations under the fee and
engagement contract executed by Claimant for my services.
7.

I am not aware of any facts, any documents, or any witness testimony that would

support a finding that my claim for attorney fees is unreasonable.
8.

In any communications that I have had from the Commission, Mr. McDougal, or

Sharon Delanoy of the Commission's staff, I have not been made aware of any facts, any
documents, or any witness testimony that would support a finding that my claim for attorney fees
is unreasonable.
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9.

I am not aware of the Constitutional or statutory basis for the Commission's

fmding that my claim for attorney fees is unreasonable, and consequently, I am not aware of the
conclusions of law that the Commission made or the facts to which it applied its conclusions.
10.

Without more information as to the facts, documents, and witness testimony that

the Commission relied upon in finding that my claim to be unreasonable, and without any notice
of the conclusions of law made by the Commission, I am unable to prepare the factual and legal
elements necessary to participate at a hearing on the ORDER.
11.

Adding to my lack of information on how to prepare for said hearing is the fact

that the ORDER states that "Attorney has previously withheld $3,301.72 as fees, un-itemized as
to the specific benefits obtained other than "Benefits, paid prior to Lump Sum... "." However, I
filed my Affidavit with the Commission on July 24,2009 (which the Commission considered,
according to Mr. McDougal's letter to me) which contains the following itemization in paragraph
8: "The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI
benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of
$5438.13, on which attorney fees of $1359.53 were paid." Accordingly, I do not know what
itemization the Commission considers to be lacking.
12.

As I noted in my MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022

filed with the Commission on July 24, 2009, I am aware of recent rulings by the Commission
denying an attorney's right to receive attorney fees on permanent partial impairment (pPI)
benefits. However, in the instant case, the ORDER found that it was unreasonable for me to
receive attorney fees of$1359.53 on permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits of$5438.13 (as
set forth in my July 24, 2009 Affidavit quoted in the previous paragraph), which benefits I had
obtained for my client beginning some six months prior to reaching an agreement for lump sum
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.
942 W. MyrUe Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PAGE: 3 OF 4

settlement. I cannot conceive of any facts or circumstances that would have led the Commission
to conclude that claiming attorney fees on PPD benefits obtained for a Claimant is unreasonable
(especially since the same ORDER allows attorney fees on other PPD benefits, and the factual
basis for both sets ofPPDs is one and the same), and therefore I am unable to prepare the factual
and legal elements necessary to address the Commission's finding in regard to fees on PPD
benefits.

FURTHER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.

Dated September 18,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on September 18,2009.

W~ D· We-J::C-CiL
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: tJAMfA t fDA-+f-"D
My Commission expires: 1 f 1.-S-(2.0 12...
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
PO Box. 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0041
(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321
C.L "BurcH" 0'n'ER, GOVERNOR

COMMISSIONERS
R.O. Maynard. o.irman
Thomas E. Limbaugh
'I'bonw P. Baskin

1-800-950-2110

MiDdy Montpncry. Oircctor

September 3,2009
Andrew Marsh
Seiniger Law Office
942 W Myrtle '
Boise, ID 83702

Re:

Claimant: Laurel Kulm
2006-012770
Proposed settlement with Indemnity Insurance Company of America

Ie #:

Dear Mr. Marsh:
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement agreement
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12 regarding your representation of
the claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staffhas made an initial determination
that the settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested
fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration, which have not
been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033.
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing
available funds, and fees which have been determined to be reasonable.

Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement

Scott McDougall
Manager, Claims and Benefits

700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boi5c, ID
Equal Opportunity Employcr
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LAVV OFF!C;;;'"S
Proftssional Association
A.'IDREW C. MARsH
Idaho, Indiana, and Missofl!i

WM. BRECK SEINIGER,JR.
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia
JULIE MARsH SEINIGER
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia

September 19,2009
VIA EMAIL TOpurdue2you@msn.com
And VIA U.S. MAIL
Laurel Kulm
2090 Avenida de las Alturas
Santa Fe, NM 87505

RE:

Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center

Dear Laurel:
This is in follow-up to the Skype conversation you had with Breck and me on or about
September 11,2009. As you know, we have inquired if you would be interested in
executing an affidavit in support of our claim of attorney's fees on the permanent partial
impairment (PPI) rating benefits, and on a portion of the permanent partial disability
(PPD) benefits, paid on the injury that is the subject of your worker's compensation case
before the Idaho Industrial Commission in which we are representing you.
The amount involved is $3301.72, which is the amount of attorney fees that the Industrial
Commission ruled in its Order filed 9/4/09 to have not been substantiated as reasonable.
(The Order was emailed to you earlier.)
Unless the Commission or an appellate court changes the Order, you will receive the
additional sum of $3301.72, instead of that sum being awarded to us for attorney fees.
(Of course, regardless of this issue you will still also receive the $9740.00 as set forth in
the Lump Sum Agreement you signed.)
This raises a conflict of interest on our part, in that it is against your [mandaI interest to
support our claim for these attorneys' fees. I have attached a copy ofIdaho Rule of
Profession Conduct 1.7 and its Commentary for your review, which addresses conflicts of
interest between clients and lawyers (which can arise from the lawyer's own interests as
mentioned in Commentary [1 D. You can go to the following web site to review the rules
of ethics, from which I copied the attached rule:
http://isb.idaho . gov / general/rules/irpc .html.
A lawyer has an obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Therefore,
during the phone conversation we had last week, we advised you of certain things that
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will be included in your affidavit concerning this conflict of interest if you elect to waive
any conflict of interest and file an affidavit in support of our claim for attorneys fees on
the PPI and PPD benefits obtained for you for your injury. The proposed affidavit will be
sent to you under separate cover.
If, after reviewing the attached, you still wish to file an affidavit in support of our motion
for attorney fees, I request that you sign the attached waiver and return it to me. Again,
you have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or sign an affidavit supporting our
claim for those attorney's fees. Thank you.

Andrew Marsh

P.S. You may scan and email your signed waiver, or you may fax it to our temporary fax
number of 208-433-9727. In any event, please also mail an original of your signature to
us. Thank you.
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RULE 1.7: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS

(a)

Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a c!ient if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1)

the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or

(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the personal
interests of the lawyer, including family and domestic relationships.
(b)

Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may
represent a client if:
(1)

the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4)

each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Commentary

General Principles
[1]
Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent
conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from
the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest. see Rule 1.8. For former
client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For
definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b).
[2]
Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or
clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite
the existence of a conflict, Le., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under
paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include
both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially
limited under paragraph (a)(2).
[3]
A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be
declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To
determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and
type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See
also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer'S violation
of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see
Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
[4]
If a confiict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the
representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b).
See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is
determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to
represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also
Comments [5] and [29].
[5]
Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or
realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the
lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on
the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the
conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule
1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has
withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).
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Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse
[6]
Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that clienfs
informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer
represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is
directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the
lawyer's ability to represent the client effectlvely. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is
undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that c1ienfs case less effectlvely out of deference to the other
client. i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client.
Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a
witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in
the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only
economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not
ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respectlve clients.

[7]
Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent
the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transactlon but in another,
unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation
[8]
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the dient will be materially limited as a
result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals
seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible
positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses
altematives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself
require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if
it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering altematives
or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client

Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons
[9]
In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially
limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as
fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

Personal Interest Conflicts
[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For
example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for
the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions conceming possible employment
with an opponent of the lawyer's client. or with a law firm representing the opponent. such discussions could materially
limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect
representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest.
See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactlons with
clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law
firm).
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related
by blood, marriage or other domestic relationship, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed
and that the lawyer's domestic relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a
result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the
lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to-another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling,
spouse or domestic partner, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another
party, unless each dient gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a dose family or domestic relationship
is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.
[12]
A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates
the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).
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Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service
[13]
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-cIient, if the client is informed of that
fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the
client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a Significant risk that the lawyer's
representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the
lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer wiho is also a co-cIient, then the lawyer must comply with the
requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining wihether the conflict is
consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

Prohibited Representations
Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph
[14]
(b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot property ask for sudh agreement or
provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. \Nhen the lawyer is representing more than one client, the
question of consentability must be resolved as to eadh client.
[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering wihether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected
if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under
paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).
[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable
law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one
defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain
representations by a former govemment lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In
addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, sudh as a municipality, to consent to a
conflict of interest.
[17]
Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous
development of eadh client's position wihen the clients are aligned directly against eadh other in the same litigation or
other proceeding before a tribunal. \Nhether clients are aligned directly against eadh other within the meaning of this
paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's
multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under
Rule 1.0(m», sudh representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

Informed Consent
[18]
Informed consent requires that eadh affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material
and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule
1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks
involved. \Nhen representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the
implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on
confidentiality).
[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example,
wihen the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure
necessary to permit the other client to make an informed deCision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In
some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation
with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation,
are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining wihether common representation is in the client's
interests.

Consent Confirmed in Writing
[20]
Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a
writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the
client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is
not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or
transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need
in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened
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with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available altematives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to
consider the risks and altematives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress
upon clients the seriousness of the deciSion the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that
might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Revoking Consent
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the
lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer
from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the
client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client
and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict
[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test
of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably
understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future
representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those
representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to
consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective
with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be
ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other
hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that
a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented
by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the
representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are
such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).

Conflicts in Litigation
[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients'
consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as
coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in
the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing parly or the fact that there are substantially
different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well
as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of
persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.
[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different
clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the
interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of
interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the
lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client
will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in
determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is
substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate
and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is
significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of
the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit,
unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying
paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before
representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a
class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an
unrelated matter.

Nonlitigation Conflicts
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[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of
directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is
significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or
clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely
prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].
[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called
upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a
conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust,
including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's
relationship to the parties involved.
[28] Vv'hether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is
permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among
them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually
advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs,
working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a
property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing
the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of
incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer
that the lawyer act for all of them.

Special Considerations in Common Representation
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the
common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the
clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is
plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation
or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial
between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality
can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility
that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors
are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continUing basis and whether the situation involves
creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.
[30] A particulariy important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on clientlawyer confidentiality and the attorneY-Client privilege. \iVith regard to the attomey-client privilege, the prevailing rule is
that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation
eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so
advised.
[31]
As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one
client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so
because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each Client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything
bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that
information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as
part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that
the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from
the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the
clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example,
the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely
affect representation involving a jOint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the
informed consent of both clients.
[32] Vv'hen seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's
role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to
assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope
of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at
the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent
representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to
discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
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Organizational Clients

[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not. by virtue of that representation. necessarily
represent any constituent or affiliated organization. such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus. the lawyer
for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter. unless the
circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer. there is an understanding
between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates.
or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's
representation of the other client.
[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may
arise. the potential intensity of the conflict. the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the
corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will
compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment. the lawyer should not serve as a director or should
cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of
the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of
director might not be protected by the attomey-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the
lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation
in a matter.
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WAIVER OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
I have read the foregoing letter dated September 19, 2009 and the foregoing ethics Rule
1.7. I understand the nature and extent of the conflict of interest that Seiniger Law
Offices, P.A. has in regard to the attorney fee issue in my worker's compensation case
titled Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center.

I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72
to support their claim for attorney fees. I knowingly and voluntarily elect to waive the
conflict of interest.
I understand that I have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or to sign an
affidavit supporting the claim of Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. for attorney's fees.
I have had an opportunity to discuss this issue with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. to my
satisfaction. I also understand that I have the right to consult with separate legal counsel
before signing this waiver or before signing any affidavit.
Date

q /;).{/O 9
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.2009.
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)

Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAw OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
.Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE mE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
LC. No. 06-012770
VB.

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.
STAre OF
County of

/J.ov.J HM~

~ -t:JL

)
)ss
)

Laurel Kulm, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. I am the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. I was inj ured in my workplace on or about November 2, 2006. At the time I was working

as a sleep technologist. In years past, I had worked as a paralegal, among other things.
3. I retained Seiniger Law Offices, P.A (hereinafter "Counsel") to represent me in the
above-entitled matter. I signed a CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT IN A
S8N1GER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle street
Boise, Idaho 63702
(200) 34&1(XXl

AFFIDAVIT Qf LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF C~S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOil ATI.l'jtNEY FEES
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE (hereinafter "FEE AGREEMENT'). dated June
1,2007.

4. I read and ooderstood the FEE AGREEMENT before I signed it. I had an opportunity to
discuss its terms with Counsel before signing. I understood that Co\ID.Sel was going to
receive an attorney fee on any benefits that were received after representation began,
including benefits from a permanent partial impairment rating (PPI) and benefits from a
finding of permanent partial disability (PPD), if any.
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, my employer and its surety had not guaranteed any benefits to
me.
6. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know if! would have any permanent impairment. No
doctor had said to me that I would, or would not, have any permanent impairment
7. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know if I would have any permanent work
restrictions from my injury.
8. Prior to retaining CO\ID.Sel, I did not know if! would have any permanent partial
disability. mtimately, my Counsel sent me for a vocational evaluation by Dr. Mary
Barros-Bailey, who made a finding ofPPD.
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the
run-around from the worker's compensation adjuster; I had been told that I might not
have a case; I had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was pre-existing from degenerative disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted
advice on what to do; I wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I
wanted an attorney to fight for me. 1 believed that I was getting pushed around bec1UlS6 I,
did not have a lawyer.
SBNlGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 93702

(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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10. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent
fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested. but it was worth it to
me because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal counselor and as my advoCate.
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis.
12. I have received and reviewed the Industrial Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT filed September 4, 2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"), including the
Commission's findings in the ORDER. that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033." I have also
received and reviewed a letter dated September 3, 2009, from Scott McDougal, Manager
of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per lDAPA 17.02.08.033."
13. I do not agree with the above fmdings that the attorney fees being requested by my
Counsel are not reasonable. As I have stated to my Counsel on several occasions, I
believe that they did an excellent job for me on my case.
14. I have not been consulted by the Commission or by Mr. McDougal on the issue of the
reasonableness of the requested attorney fees or on the issue of whether I would like to
have my FEE AGREEMENT with Counsel upheld
15. I believe that I have a right to have my FEE AGREEMENT with my Counsel upheld apd
I would like for it to be upheld, including my obligation to pay the agreed fee in full to
Counsel for the services provided.

sa NIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(203) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEV'S
REQUEST FOR A'ITORNEY FEES
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16. I tmderstand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72
to support my Counsel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, 1
knowingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full.

FURTHER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.
Dated

ct/Cb

rJ ~

,2009.

~~

Laurel Kulm
Claimant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for the state of
1Vw TvVX"lD , on this the :2..Jsf day of :kpkmber ,2009.

~~t·~
Signature of NotalYPuh~

~at\n-e ~'1b.J

Printed Name
Residing at:
.

" "

."

My Commission expires:

S8NIGER lAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street

Bdse, Idaho 83702
(200) 34&1000
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kuhn,
Claimant,

I.e. No. 06-012770
VS.

EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING
TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT
Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

This matter coming before the Commission upon the motion of Claimant's Counsel to
permit Seiniger Law Offices to provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in
support of its claim for attorneys fees, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

By:

On behalf of the Idaho Industrial Commission

EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING
TF.STTMONV RV AFF1l)A VTT

L\ COpy
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770
vs.

EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING
TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT
Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.
This matter coming before the Commission upon the motion of Claimant's Counsel to
permit Seiniger Law Offices to provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in
support of its claim for attorneys fees, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

By:

On behalf of the Idaho Industrial Commission

EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING
rnSTTMONV RV AFFTOA VTT
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770

vs.

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,

MOTION TO ADD
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
AS AN EXHIBIT TO COUNSEL'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's counsel, and hereby moves this Commission to allow Counsel
to add the AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES as an exhibit to Counsel's MOTION TO RECONSIDER
that was previously filed with this Commission on September 18,2009. Said AFFIDAVIT is
attached to the instant Motion as Exhibit A. The grounds for the instant Motion are that it is in
the interests of justice for the Commission to consider the evidence contained in said
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM, in that Ms. Kulm is the Claimant in the above-captioned
case and as such she has an interest in having her voice heard before the Commission makes its
ruling on Counsel's MOTION TO RECONSIDER. Counsel submits that the instant Motion is
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MOTION TO ADD AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
AS AN EXHIBIT TO COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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being made \vithin the 20-day time period set forth in J.R.P. 3 (F) regarding motions to
reconsider. The relief sought by this Motion is for the Commission to allow Counsel to add the
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEY FEES as an exhibit to Counsel's MOTION TO RECONSIDER that is already
on file with this Commission.

Dated September 24, 2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

~~~

Andr Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on September 24,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
PO Box 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510
[RJFax

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

An~1t~
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MOTION TO ADD AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
AS AN EXHIBIT TO COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (rSB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (rSB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAw OFFICES, P.A
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attomeys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel KuIm,
Claimant,

I.e. No. 06-012770
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF
County of
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Laurel Kulm, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
I. I am the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. I was injured in my workplace on or about November 2, 2006. At the time I was working
as a sleep technologist. In years past, I had worked as a paralegal, among other things.
3. r retained Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (hereinafter "Counsel") to represent me in the
above-entitled matter. I signed a CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEtv.IENT IN A
SEJNIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT Qf LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CJ-AIMAl'IT'S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR. ATTp~EY FEES
"':'

'
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE (hereinafter "FEE AGREEMENT"), dated Jlille
1,2007.

4. I read and understood the FEE AGREEMENT before I signed it. I had an opportunity to
discuss its terms with Counsel before signing. I understood that Counsel was going to
receive an attorney fee on any benefits that were received after representation began,
including benefits from a permanent partial impairment rating (PPl) and benefits from a
finding of permanent partial disability (PPD), if any.
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, my employer and its surety had not guaranteed any benefits to

me.
6. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know in would have any permanent impairment. No
doctor had said to me that I would, or would not, have any permanent impairment
7. Prior to retaining COlillsel, I did not know if I would have any permanent work
restrictions from my injury.
8. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know in would have any permanent partial
disability. Ultimately, my Counsel sent me for a vocational evaluation by Dr. Mary
Barros-Bailey, who made a finding ofPPD.
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the
run-around from the worker's compensation adjuster; I had been told that I might not
have a case; I had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was preexisting from degenerative disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted
advice on what to do; I wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I
wanted an attorney to fight for me. I believed that I was getting pushed arolilld because I
did not have a lawyer.
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345.1000

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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lO. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent
fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested, but it was worth it to
me because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal counselor and as my advocate.
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis.
12. I have received and reviewed the Industrial Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE

AL~D

LUMP SUM

SETTLEMENT filed September 4,2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"), including the
Commission's findings in the ORDER that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAP A 17.02.08.033." I have also
received and reviewed a letter dated September 3, 2009, from Scott McDougal, Manager
of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033."
13. I do not agree with the above findings that the attorney fees being requested by my
Counsel are not reasonable. As I have stated to my Counsel on several occasions, I
believe that they did an excellent job for me on my case.
14. I have not been consulted by the Commission or by Mr. McDougal on the issue of the
reasonableness of the requested attorney fees or on the issue of whether I would like to
have my FEE AGREEMENT with Counsel upheld
15. I believe that I have a right to have my FEE AGREEMENT with my Counsel upheld and
I would like for it to be upheld, including my obligation to pay the agreed fee in full to
Counsel for the services provided.

SElNIGERLAWOFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR AITORl'l'EY FEES
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16. I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72
to support my Counsel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, I
knowingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full.

FURTHER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGID.

Dated

CU, d.- { 1d
{

,2009.

Laurel Kulm
Claimant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for the state of
Nf.iJJ \VVX fl C ,on this the :21$f day of '1e p km be c
, 2009.

,Jew ,-vI-e;{I{ D
t2~

Printed Name
Residing at
My Commission expires: JClYtiJo.. y ,/

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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SElNIGER. LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMlSSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kuhn,
Claim.ant,
I.e. No, 06-012770
VS.

MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO
ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDA vrr
Mercy Medical Center,
Em.ployer.
and

Industrial Claims Managemen~
Surety,

Defendants.
COMES NOW Seiniger Law Offices, F.A., ClaimiUlt's Counsel, and hereby moves this
Commission to enter the attached proposed ex parte order permitting Seinlger Law Offices to
provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in suppon of its claim for
attorneys. Doing so will shorten the time for hearing by allowing Claimant'1) Counsel to create a
record for the Coromi.ssions review of the facts to which member's of the rum CQuid testify and
documents that could be iden.tified in. such testimony, but which would consume time. This
motion is also based upon a desire to minimize the awkwardness of Claimant's Counsel having
to e~am.ine themselves, though they will be present at hearing to be questioned by the
Commission. This will also prevent the Claimant from having to travel from Same Fe, New
S:EJNlG£Jt LA.W OFPlCR:S, P.A.
!14.2 W. Myrtlt Strtel
Boia., IdllOho S370l
t'>/ljt\ "IAC.1MA
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEIN1GER LAW OFFICES, P .A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770
VS.

MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO
ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., Claimant's Counsel, and hereby moves this
Commission to enter the attached proposed ex parte order permitting Seiniger Law Offices to
provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in support of its claim for
attorneys. Doing so will shorten the time for hearing by allowing Claimant's Counsel to create a
record for the Commissions review of the facts to which member's of the fIrm could testify and
documents that could be identifIed in such testimony, but which would consume time. This
motion is also based upon a desire to minimize the awkwardness of Claimant's Counsel having
to examine themselves, though they will be present at hearing to be questioned by the
Commission. This will also prevent the Claimant from having to travel from Sante Fe, New
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(")n2\ U.c:_11\A1\

MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO
ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT
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Mexico for the hearing, and Claimant's Counsel from having to call Defense Counsel as a
witness thereby taking up his time unnecessarily.
The Claimant does not contest Counsel's right to attorney fees as per the Affidavit of
Laurel Kulm filed herewith and the signed waiver of conflict of interest.
Dated November 3,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

~r
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on November 3,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
PO Box 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510
akhull@ajhlaw.com
Laurel Kulm
2090 Avenida de las Alturas
Santa Fe, NM 87505

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO
ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT
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LA V'" 0 FFI CP'S
ProjessilJnal Association
ANDREW C. MARsH

WM. BRECK SEINIGER,JR.
Idaho, O"'gon, Washington, and the District of Columbia

Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri

JULIE MARsH SEINIGER
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia

September 19, 2009
VIA EMAIL TOpurdue2you@msn.com
And VIA U.S. MAIL
Laurel Kulm
2090 A venida de las Alturas
Santa Fe, NM 87505

RE:

Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center

Dear Laurel:
This is in follow-up to the Skype conversation you had with Breck and me on or about
September 11, 2009. As you know, we have inquired if you would be interested in
executing an affidavit in support of our claim of attorney's fees on the permanent partial
impairment (PP!) rating benefits, and on a portion of the permanent partial disability
(PPD) benefits, paid on the injury that is the subject of your worker's compensation case
before the Idaho Industrial Commission in which we are representing you.
The amount involved is $3301.72, which is the amount of attorney fees that the Industrial
Commission ruled in its Order filed 9/4/09 to have not been substantiated as reasonable.
(The Order was emailed to you earlier.)
Unless the Commission or an appellate court changes the Order, you will receive the
additional sum of $3301.72, instead of that sum being awarded to us for attorney fees.
(Of course, regardless of this issue you will still also receive the $9740.00 as set forth in
the Lump Sum Agreement you signed.)
This raises a conflict of interest on our part, in that it is against your fmancial interest to
support our claim for these attorneys' fees. I have attached a copy ofIdaho Rule of
Profession Conduct 1.7 and its Commentary for your review, which addresses conflicts of
interest between clients and lawyers (which can arise from the lawyer's own interests as
mentioned in Commentary [1 D. You can go to the following web site to review the rules
of ethics, from which I copied the attached rule:
http://isb.idaho.gov/generallrules/irpc.html.
A lawyer has an obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Therefore,
during the phone conversation we had last week, we advised you of certain things that
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will be included in your affidavit concerning this conflict of interest if you elect to waive
any conflict of interest and file an affidavit in support of our claim for attorneys fees on
the PPI and PPD benefits obtained for you for your injury. The proposed affidavit will be
sent to you under separate cover.
If, after reviewing the attached, you still wish to file an affidavit in support of our motion
for attorney fees, I request that you sign the attached waiver and return it to me. Again,
you have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or sign an affidavit supporting our
claim for those attorney's fees. Thank: you.

Andrew Marsh

P.S. You may scan and email your signed waiver, or you may fax it to our temporary fax
number of208-433-9727. In any event, please also mail an original of your signature to
us. Thank: you.
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RULE 1.7: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS
(a)

(b)

Except as provided in paragraph (b). a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1)

the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or

(2)

there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the personal
interests of the lawyer, including family and domestic relationships.

Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may
represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client;
(2)

the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3)

the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(4)

each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Commentary

General Principles
[1]
Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent
conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from
the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former
client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For
definitions of "informed consent" and ·confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b).
[2]
Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or
clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3} decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite
the existence of a conflict, Le., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under
paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include
both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially
limited under paragraph (a)(2).
[3]
A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be
declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To
determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and
type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See
also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation
of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see
Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
[4J
If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the
representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b).
See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is
determined both by the lawyer'S ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to
represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer'S duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also
Comments [5] and [29J.
[5]
Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or
realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the
lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on
the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the
conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule
1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has
withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c}.

942 W. MYRTIE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700

AndteW@SeinigerLaw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com

September 19,2009
Page 4 0/9
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse
[6J
Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that clienfs
informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer
represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is
directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the
lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is
undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other
client, Le., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client.
Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a
witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in
the lawsuit. On the other hand, simUltaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only
economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not
ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.

[7J
Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent
the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another,
unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation
[8]
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a
result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals
seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible
positions that each might take because of the lawyer'S duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses
altematives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself
require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if
it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering altematives
or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.

Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons
In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially
[9]
limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as
fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

Personal Interest Conflicts
[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For
example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for
the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions conceming possible employment
with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially
limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect
representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest.
See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with
clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law
firm).
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related
by blood, marriage or other domestic relationship, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed
and that the lawyer'S domestic relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a
result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the
lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling,
spouse or domestic partner, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another
party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family or domestic relationship
is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.
[12]
A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates
the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).
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Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service
[13]
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is infonmed of that
fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the
client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's
representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the
lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the
requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including detenmining whether the conflict is
consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate infonmation about the material risks of the representation.

Prohibited Representations
[14]
Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph
(b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot property ask for such agreement or
provide representation on the basis of the clienfs consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the
question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.
[15] Consentability is typically detenmined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected
if the clients are penmitted to give their infonmed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under
paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).
[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable
law. For example, in some states SUbstantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one
defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain
representations by a fonmer govemment lawyer are prohibited, despite the infonmed consent of the fonmer client. In
addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a govemmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a
conflict of interest.
[17]
Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous
development of each clienfs pOSition when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or
other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this
paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's
multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under
Rule 1.0(m», such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

Informed Consent
[18]
Infonmed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material
and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule
1.0(e) (infonmed consent). The infonmation required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks
involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the infonmation must include the
implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attomey-client
privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on
confidentiality).
[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example,
when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure
necessary to penmit the other client to make an infonmed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In
some cases the altemative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation
with the possibility of inCUrring additional CO$ts. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation,
are factors that may be considered by the affected client in detenmining whether common representation is in the client's
interests.

Consent Confirmed in Writing
[20]
Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the infonmed consent of the client, confinmed in writing. Such a
writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the
client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is
not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives infonmed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or
transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not sup::>lant the need
in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the Client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened
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with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available altematives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to
consider the risks and altematives and to raise questions and concems. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress
upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that
might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Revoking Consent
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the
lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer
from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the
client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client
and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict
[22] Whether a lawyer may property request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test
of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably
understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future
representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those
representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to
consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective
with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be
ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other
hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that
a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularty if, e.g., the client is independently represented
by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the
representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are
such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).

Conflicts in Litigation
[23] Paragraph (b}(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients'
consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as
coplaintiffs or codefendants, is govemed by paragraph (a}(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in
the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially
different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well
as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of
persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.
[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different
clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the
interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of
interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the
lawyer'S effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client
will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in
determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is
substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate
and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is
significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of
the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a ctass of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit,
unnamed members of the class are ordinal"ily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying
paragraph (a}(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before
representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a
class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an
unrelated matter.

Nonlitigation Conflicts
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[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of
directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is
significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or
clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely
prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].
[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called
upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a
conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust,
including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's
relationship to the parties involved.
[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is
permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among
them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually
advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs,
working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a
property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing
the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of
incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer
that the lawyer act for all of them.

Special Considerations in Common Representation
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the
common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the
clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is
plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation
or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial
between commonly represented clients, representation of mUltiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality
can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility
that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors
are whether the lawyer subsequentiy will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves
creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.
[30] A particularty important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on clientlawyer confidentiality and the attomey-client privilege. With regard to the attomey-client privilege, the prevailing rule is
that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation
eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so
advised.
[31]
As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one
client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so
because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything
bearing on the representation that might affect that clienfs interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that
information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as
part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that
the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from
the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the
clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example,
the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely
affect representation involving a jOint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the
informed consent of both clients.
[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's
role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to
assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope
of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at
the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent
representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 conceming the obligations to a fOmler client. The client also has the right to
discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
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Organizational Clients
[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily
represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a}. Thus, the lawyer
for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the
circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding
between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates,
or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's
representation of the other client.
[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may
arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the
corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will
compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should
cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of
the board that in some clrcumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of
director might not be protected by the attomey-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the
lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation
in a matter.
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WAIVER OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

I have read the foregoing letter dated September 19,2009 and the foregoing ethics Rule
1.7. I understand the nature and extent of the conflict of interest that Seiniger Law
Offices, P.A. has in regard to the attorney fee issue in my worker's compensation case
titled Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center.
I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72
to support their claim for attorney fees. I knowingly and voluntarily elect to waive the

conflict of interest.
I understand that I have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or to sign an
affidavit supporting the claim ofSeiniger Law Offices, P.A. for attorney's fees.

Thave had an opportunity to discuss this issue with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. to my
satisfaction. I also understand that I have the right to consult with separate legal counsel
before signing this waiver or before signing any affidavit

Date

q !:;U /0 9
I

,2009.

~~~

Laure Kulm

o.20qo(k.v,ud!Jduk~.1 ~&I/J/-.I i75"'O:}
Address
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LA W OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE TIlE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
LC. No. 06-012770
VI.

AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF
County of
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Laurel Kulm, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. I was injured in my workplace on or about November 2, 2006. At the time I was working
as a sleep technologist. In years past, I had worked as a paralegal, among other things.
3. I retained Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (hereinafter "Counsel") to represent me in the
above-entitled matter. I signed a CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 1N A
S8N1GER L4.W OFFICES, PA,
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 8'3702

(200)34&1000
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AFFIDAVIT
LAUREL KULM
IN SUPPORT OF CJ,.A.IMANJ"S COUNSEL'S
REQUEST FOR A~Y FEES

EXHIBIT-...
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WORKER'S COMPENSAnON CASE (hereinafter "FEE AGREEMENT'), dated June
1,2007.

4. I read and understood the FEE AGREEMENT before I signed it. I had an opportunity to

discuss its terms with Coun.sel before signing. I understood that Coun.sel was going to
receive an attorney fee on any benefits that were received after representation began,
including benefits from a permanent partial impairment rating (pPI) and benefits from a
finding of permanent partial disability (PPD), if any.
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, my employer and its surety had not guaranteed any benefits to
me.
6. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know ifI would have any permanent impairment No
doctor had said to me that I would, or would not, have any permanent impairment
7. Prior to retaining Coun.sel, I did not know if I would have any permanent work
restrictions from my injury.
8. Prior to retaining Coun.sel, I did not know ifI would have any permanent partial
disability. Ultimately, my Counsel sent me for a vocational evaluation by Dr. Mary
Barros-Bailey, 'Who made a finding ofPPD.
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the
run-around from the worker's compensation adjuster, I had been told that I might not
have a case; I had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was preexisting from degenerative disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted
advice on what to do; I wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I
wanted an attorney to fight for me. I believed that I was getting pushed around bec;mse ~
did not have a lawyer.
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10. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent

fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested, but it was worth it to
me because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal C01D1selor and as my advocate.
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis.
12. I have received and reviewed the Industrial Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN

PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. RELEASE AND LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT filed September 4, 2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"'), including the
Commission's findings in the ORDER that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA ] 7.02.08.033." I have also
received and reviewed a letter dated September 3,2009, from Scott McDougal, Manager
of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223,13 Lump Sum
Consideration. , . have not been found to be reasonable per lDAPA 17.02.08.033."
13. I do not agree with the above findings that the attorney fees being requested by my
Counsel are not reasonable. As I have stated to my Counsel on several occasions, I
believe that they did an excellent job for me on my case.
14. I have not been consulted by the Commission or by Mr. McDougal on the issue of the
reasonableness of the requested attorney fees or on the issue of whether I would like to
have my FEE AGREEMENT with Counsel upheld
15. I believe that I have a right to have my FEE AGREEMENT with my Counsel upheld apd
I would like for it to be upheld, including my obligation to pay the agreed fee in full to
Counsel for the services provided

S8N1GER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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16. I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72
to support my COWlSel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, 1
knowingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full.

FURTIIER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.

q/d-. f J ~

Dated

,2009.

Laurel Kulm
Claimant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for the state of NfW
Nw Jv\tX!'/O , on this the ~/s, day of 1epk-m be r ' 2009.
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Wm. Breck Seiniget, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,

I.e. No. 06-012770
vs.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR
Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,

ATTORNEYFEEHE~G

and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. and files its STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR
ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, as follows:
1. Issues of whether the attorney fee hearing may even be held
1.1.Whether the Industrial Commission may hold an attorney fee hearing pursuant to IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03(b) under the following circumstances:
1.1.1. The Commission failed to follow its own rule in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a) that
"Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staffs informal determination,
which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not
reasonable. "
1.1.2. The Commission failed to rule on Counsel's MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW filed September 18,2009, where the
grounds for said Motion were that the Commission staff did not "notify counsel in
writing of ... the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a).
1.1.3. The Commission failed to provide the Claimant with "notice and an opportunity
to he heard," even though Claimant is one of the "contracting parties" to whom "the
Commission must afford due process," all in direct contravention of Claimant's
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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constitutional rights as set forth in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993).
2. Issues of whether the attorney fee may even be denied at this late date, even if an
attorney fee hearing is held
2.1.Ifthe Industrial Commission does hold an attorney fee hearing, whether it may refuse to
approve a request for attorney fees when the following circumstances exist:
2.1.1. The Commission failed to follow its own rule in IDAPA 17.02.08.033,03(b) that
"Commission staffwill notify counsel in writing of the sta:Ers informal determination,
which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a).
2.1.2. The Commission failed to rule on Counsel's MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW filed September 18,2009, where the
grounds for said Motion were that the Commission staff did not "notify counsel in
writing of ... the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a).
2.1.3. The Commission refused to allow Counsel to take a deposition, notice of which
was filed on September 18, 2009, of Scott McDougall, the Commission staff member
who issued "the sta:Ers informal determination ... that the requested fee is not
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a).
2.1.4. The Commission failed to rule on Counsel's MOTION TO PRODUCE
COMMISSION'S CLAIM FILE OF CLAIMANT filed September 18, 2009, and
failed to produce said file.
2.1.5. The Commission failed to provide the Claimant with "notice and an opportunity
to be heard," even though Claimant is one of the "contracting parties" to whom "the
Commission must afford due process," all in direct contravention of Claimant's
constitutional rights as set forth in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993).
3. Issues raised in Counsel's Request for Hearing
3.1.1s Claimant's Counsel entitled to retain attorney's fees paid prior to the approval of the
lump sum agreement between the parties in this case (in the approximate amount of
$3,301.72) and 25% of the new money consideration to be paid to the Claimant per the
Lump Sum Agreement in the amount of$3,055.78?
3.2.Are the attorney's fees claimed by Claimant's Counsel consistent with the fee agreement
executed by the Claimant?
3.3.Are the attorney's fees claimed by Claimant's Counsel reasonable in light of the services
performed?
3.4.1s Claimant's Counsel entitled to the attorney's fees under IDAPA 17.02.08.33? Sub
issues involved in resolving this issue include, but are not limited to:
3.4.1. Is Claimant's Counsel limited to "Available funds" as defined in IDAP A
17.02.08.33.01.a?
3.4.2. Is Claimant's Counsel's compensation limited to "The services of the attorney
operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks
to be paid... " (IDAPA 17.02.08.33.01.c.ii)?
3.4.3. Is Claimant's Counsel required to meet the standard of reasonableness contained
in IDAPA 17.02.08.33 in light of the prohibition against limiting attorneys fees to
"new money" as detennmed and contained in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,864 P.2d
132 (1993) - a case in which the precise holdings on the precise Constitutional issues
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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raised therein have never been overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court?
3.4.4. Is the Commission required to consider the equities involved in compensating
Claimant's Counsel for work done prior to and unrelated to the consideration
contained in the Lump Sum Agreement in view of the IDAPA 17.02.08.033.c.i
language, "There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable
principles... "
3.5.Does Claimant have the right to have her contract with Counsel honored, assuming it
complies with IDAPA rules and disclosure requirements?
3.6.Prior to a hearing pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.b, is Claimant's Counsel entitled
to notice of the facts and the conclusions of law upon which the Commission relied in
making its finding in the above-referenced ORDER that the attorney's fees requested by
Counsel were not reasonable?
3.7.Ifthe Commission stafffails to notify Counsel "in writing" of ' 'the reasons for the
determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as required by IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03.a., is Counsel prejudiced by the issuance of an order denying his
attorney fees?

4. Issues regarding the level of proof
4.1.Whether the Commission may interpret the level of proof pursuant to IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03 to require that proof that a "specific benefit was delayed" to be nothing
less than documentary.
4.2. Whether the Commission may interpret the level of proof pursuant to IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03 to require "absolute proof," i.e. require Counsel to prove a causal link
between his representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less
than that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid.
4.3. Whether the Commission may interpret the phrase "primarily or substantially" as it
appears in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0 1(c)(ii) to constitute a higher level of proof than
"preponderance of the evidence" as it appears in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.d.
4.4. Whether the Commission may "cherry-pick" to which benefits it will apply its
interpretation of the "primarily or substantially" standard, i.e. whether it must apply the
same level of proof and the same standards to requests for attorney fees based on timeloss or disability benefits obtained as it applies to impairment benefits obtained.
5. Due Process issues raised by Curr
5.1.Whether the Commission may interpret or apply IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in such a way that
one or more of the following results:
5.1.1. It fails to compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor.
5.1.2. It fails to recognize efforts by the attorney that do not generate monetary awards.
5.1.3. It makes suspect an attorney's integrity in the eyes of his clients.
5.1.4. It limits attorney fees to "new money" benefits.
5.1.5. It preempts representation other than in disputed matters.
5.2.Whether IDAPA 17.02.08.033 as written, interpreted, and applied by the Commission
constitutes the "clear evidentiary standards" required by Curro
5.3.Whether Claimant must be provided with "notice" of the attorney-fee hearing and an
"opportunity to be heard" at said hearing.
6. Contract property rights issues raised by CUIT
6.1. Whether the Commission may interpret or apply IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in such a way that
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.
942 W. MyrUe Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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one or more of the following results:
6.1.1. The unconstitutional impairment of the attorney's rights under the fee contract.
6.1.2. The unconstitutional impairment of the Claimant's rights under the fee contract.
6.1.3. In determining the "reasonableness" of the attorney fee, the Commission is using
its hindsight-based judgment instead of considering lithe totality of the circumstances
from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was made. II
6.1.4. In deciding whether to take the case of a claimant who solicits his services, an
attorney is essentially required to predict if the claimant will eventually have an
impairment rating (even though no physician could accurately make such a
prediction), and if so whether the surety might dispute it, and if disputed what the end
result might be.
6.2. Whether the Commission may refuse to honor a claimant's fee agreement with her
attorney over the direct objections of the claimant.
7. Issues involving reconciling IDAP A 17.02.08.033 with Curr
7.1.Whether the Commission may interpret or apply IDAPA 17.02.08.033, including without
limitation the terms "Available Funds,1I IICharging Lien,1I and IIprimarily or substantiallyll
in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, and applicable law including
without limitation I.C. 72-508.
8. Equal protection issues
8.1. Whether the Commission may constitutionally allow employers and sureties in workers'
compensation matters to pay their counsel for the mere giving oflegal advice, but not
allow claimants to pay their counsel for the mere giving of legal advice.
8.2. Whether the Commission may constitutionally promulgate separate standards for the
legal and medical professions in regard to allowing the payment for services rendered by
them in workers' compensation matters.
9. Public Policy issues
9.1.Whetherthe Commission may interpret or apply IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in such a way that
one or more of the following results:
9.1.1. Claimants are less likely to be able to find counsel to take their case.
9.1.2. Attorneys are discouraged from taking workers' compensation cases because the
Commission does not honor their fee agreements with their clients.
9.1.3. The attorney-client relationship is damaged by the Commission's creation of a
conflict of interest between attorney and client each time the Commission or its staff
finds the requested attorney fee to be unreasonable, and by the the implication in each
such instance that the attorney acted unfairly, unethically, or unreasonably.
9.1.4. The confidence of claimants and attorneys in the legal system is undermined
when the Commission, via its website and its publications, strongly encourages
claimants to seek legal advice, but at the end of the case tells claimants and attorneys
that it will not honor their fee agreement, and/or tells them that portions of the
attorney's services were of no value, not timely, or not of consequence.
9.1.5. When attorneys discontinue taking workers' compensation cases because the
Commission does not honor their fee agreements, and when as a result claimants are
unable to find counsel to take their case and as a result do not receive their full
benefits under the workers' compensation law, the burden of medical and financial
care for these unassisted claimants shifts from the insurers who collected employers'
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.
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premiums to various public welfare and private charity organizations.
9.2. Whether the Commission should be prohibited from interpreting or applying IDAPA
17.02.08.033, including especially the "dispute" language of .01(a), in such a way that
one or more of the following results:
9.2.1. The plaintiffs bar is encouraged to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least
to demonstrate and document, that there was a "fight, contest, or dispute" between the
claimant and defendants.
9.2.2. The more reputable attorneys are penalized, because they are less likely to have
benefits disputed by the surety, and therefore, less likely to receive approval from the
Commission for their attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases
in the future).
9.2.3. The surety is essentially put in charge of determining how much a claimant's
attorney will be paid, because attorney fees are based more on the surety's decisions
of what to "dispute" than on any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 of the Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services.
10. Legislative intent issues
Whether IDAP A 17.02.08.033 as written, interpreted, and applied by the
10.1.
Commission is contrary to legislative intent.
11. De Novo hearing issues
11.1.
Whether a hearing held pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(b) is not a de novo hearing,
since prior to such hearing, the Commissioners have already received an ex parte
presentation of evidence and legal reasoning from Commission staff, and therefore
whether counsel is prejudiced thereby.
12. Discovery issues
Whether counsel is entitled to discover any facts or standards upon which the
12.1.
Commission staff relied in making its informal determination pursuant to
17.02.08.033.03(a)
12.2.
Whether the manager of the benefits section and his staff members known as
compensation consultants perform any judicial, quasi-judicial, or other privileged
functions in making the staffs informal determination pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(a)

Dated: this 22 day of November, 2009.

Seiniger Law Offices, P .A.
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LAUREL KULM,
Claimant,
v.
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY
OFNA,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Ie 2006-012770

ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL
DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD

FI LED

NOV 17 2009
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Claimant's Attorney ("Attorney") filed the motion for ex parte order to allow testimony
by affidavit on November 4, 2009 with additional documents, including Attorney's
correspondence with Claimant on September 19, 2009; Claimant's waiver of the conflict of
interest signed on September 21,2009; and, Claimant's affidavit in support of Attorney's request
for fees. Attorney requests that the Commission include the documents as part of the record for
Attorney's upcoming hearing on his entitlement to attorney's fees under IDAP A 17.02.08.033.
Attorney's request to include these documents into the record is GRANTED.
DATED this m y of

~ 2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

tj)!m~

R.D. Maynard, Cha

an

ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD - 1
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ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / ~y of ~
, 2009 a true and correct copy of
Order Granting Supplemental Documents to the Record was served by regular United States
Mail upon each of the following persons:

'1

BRECKSEINIGER
942 W MYRTLE ST
BOISE ID 83702
ALAN HULL
250 SOUTH 5TH STE. 700
POBOX 7426
BOISE ID 83707-7426

cs-mlcjh

ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD - 2
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES,

P .A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
REGARDING ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE
IN RENTERIA v. RICK CARLEY
CONSTRUCTION LLC and
LffiERTY NORTHWEST, I.G.~06-507603

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

~-

c-:!

. ,

i'''<1.

)
)ss
)

Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P .A., and attorney of record
for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. An attorney fee hearing was held in the above-entitled matter on Nov. 23, 2009. At said
hearing (beginning at page 50 of the transcript of said hearing), the Commissioners and

Mr. Breck Seiniger (Claimant's Counsel) held a discussion regarding attorney fee issues
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH REGARDING ATIORNEY FEE
ISSUE IN RENTERIA v. RICK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION LLC AND
LIBERTY NORTHWEST, LC. 06-507603
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in the case ofRENTERlA V. RlCK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION LLC AND LIBERTY
NORTHWEST, I.e. 06-507603 (hereinafter "Renteria"), in which this firm represented
claimant Jose Renteria.
3. In Renteria, the claimant was due a scheduled PPI benefit for an eye enucleation surgery
authorized by the surety. After the surgery, the surety ignored Counsel's repeated
demands for payment of PPI benefits for nearly four months, until fmally Counsel filed a
complaint and motion for emergency hearing. In response, surety agreed to start paying
the undisputed benefits if Counsel would withdraw the motion, which Counsel did.
Subsequently, the parties reached a lump sum settlement agreement at mediation. The
LSSA provided for Counsel to receive attorney fees of25% of the PPI benefits, on the
basis that but for Counsel's litigation, surety would not have started paying the PPI
benefits. However, the Commission refused to approve the LSSA. More than a year later,
the parties entered a second lump sum settlement agreement, in which the terms were
essentially identical to the first LSSA except that Counsel waived his right to receive
attorney fees on the PPI benefit. The second LSSA was promptly approved by the
Commission. The Commission's rejection of the first LSSA resulted in a substantial loss
to Counsel of earned attorney fees on the PPI benefits.
4. At the above-refereIiced hearing, the Commissioners seemed to indicate that under the
above facts, Counsel may have been entitled to an attorney fee on the PPI benefits.
Because the Commissioners expressed interest in this issue, Counsel is providing this
Affidavit and the facts surrounding the Renteria case.
5. In support of the facts set forth herein, the following documents from the Renteria case
are attached hereto as Exhibits A thru F:
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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a. Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing, and Affidavit in Support Thereof, filed
2/7/08.
b. Notice of Withdrawal of Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing, filed 2/12/08.
c. (for the first LSSA) Form 1022, filed 6/6/08.
d. Letter from Dennis Burks, Mediator, notifying Counsel of the Commission's
denial of the first LSSA, dated 6/16/08.
e. (for the second LSSA) Form 1022, filed 11110/09.
f.

(for the second LSSA) Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and
Order of Approval and Discharge, approved 11/16/09.

FURTHER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.

Dated December 24, 2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

4.,hf?W~

An}ltew Marsh
Morney for Claimant

L

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on December 24,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document (with the exception of the exhibits, omitted due to the volume of pages but which
will promptly be provided upon request) to be served as follows:
Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH REGARDING ATIORNEY FEE
ISSUE IN RENTERIA v. RICK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION LLC AND
LIBERTY NORTHWEST, I.C. 06-507603
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PO Box 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510
lRlFax

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

"

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH REGARDING ATIORNEY FEE
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· LJ COpy
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83707
Voice: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
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Attorneys for the Claimant

-;e.

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOSE RENTERIA,
Claimant,
-,--

vs.

I. C. No. 06-5076j3

RICK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION, LLC,

MOTION REQutS'I'ING
EMERGENCY IiEA:R.lNG

Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST,
Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW the Claimant in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel,
pursuant to Ru1e Vill(D) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Law, and hereby requests this Commission schedu1e an emergency
hearing in the above-captioned matter regarding Defendants' failure to pay permanent
impairment benefits and time-loss benefits, as well as an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C.
§72-804.
The primary issue in this case is that Defendants, without reasonable ground and without
explanation, and despite repeated demands from Claimant's counsel, have failed to pay statutory
MOTION REQUESTING EMERGENCY HEARING
Page 1
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benefits for loss of an eye in a workplace accident, even though Defendants have paid medical
benefits on the claim, and even though Defendants have never disputed that Claimant was an
employee, that an accident occurred, that Claimant's eye was injured in the accident, and that
surgical removal of the injured eye was necessitated by the accident.
The facts underlying the matter are set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, counsel
for Claimant, and its accompanying exhibits, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
It is necessary for the Commission to hear this matter on an emergency basis because

Claimant has a grave financial need for the benefits being withheld.
A second issue is whether the actions of the employer and the surety are such that
Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. 72-804.
Based upon the foregoing, Claimant requests that the Industrial Commission schedule an
emergency hearing at the earliest available date as follows:
1. Issues:

a

Whether Claimant is entitled to time-loss benefits from the date of injury and
from the date of enucleation surgery;

b. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent impairment benefits for surgical
removal of an eye following a workplace injury to the eye;
c. Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees.
2. Location of the hearing:

The Claimant requests that this matter be scheduled for

hearing in Boise.
3. Desired date of the hearing: At any time. Claimant's counsel requests a call prior to the
scheduling of this matter to ensure that dates currently available remain available.
4. Unavailable dates of counsel: Claimant's counsel is unavailable as follows:
MOTION REQUESTING EMERGENCY HEARING
Page 2

SEINlGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
208·345-1000

IJ-O

February 7-12, 15, 18,20 & 27-29;
March 3, 6, & 21;
April 7, 14-18 & 24, 2008.

5. Estimated length of hearing: One half(1I2) day.
6. Settlement negotiation statuslMediation:

Because this case involves Defendants'

refusal to meet statutory responsibilities as set forth above, 'mediation of this claim would
not provide an adequate remedy.

7. Hearing by the full Commission: Not necessary.
8. Translator:

The Claimant requires the services of a Spanish translator during the

hearing of this matter.

9. Other Information: Claimant requests that the matter be set for a telephone conference
to confirm continuing availability of hearing dates and to narrow the issues to be
addressed at the hearing.

/

Dated: this

-'2 day of February 2008.

~&()~

An wMarsh
Attorney for Claimant

MOTION REQUESTING EMERGENCY HEARING
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SEINIGDt LAW OFFICES, P.A..
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
208-345·1000
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

£

I CERTIFY that on this
day of February 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served as follows:

r:&J Via Facsimile Transmission

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 7507
Boise,TID 83707-1507

a Via First Class USPS mail
a Via Certified USPS mail
a Via Hand Delivery

Fax: (800) 256-3856

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

MOTION REQUESTING EMERGENCY HEARING
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
208-345-1000

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387)
Andrew Marsh (ISB #6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Voice:
(208) 345-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Plaintiff

BEFORE THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
.JOSE RENTERIA,
Claimant,

IIC No. 06-507603

vs.

RICK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION, LLC,

j

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION REQUESTING
EMERGENCY HEARING

Employer,

and

LffiERTY NORTHWEST,
Surety,
Defendants.
Andrew Marsh, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1.

I am the Counsel for Claimant in the above-entitled case.

2.

I am over the age of eighteen years.

3.

I make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge and belief.

4.

On 10118/07, Claimant underwent enucleation (surgical removal) of his left eye in the
above-captioned workers compensation matter. See medical record-of Dr. Mark
Boehner, attached as Exhibit A.

fXHlBlTL
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH- 1
\

1;"3

5.

On 10/24/07, Counsel faxed a request for time-loss benefits to Defendants. See
ExhibitB.

6.

On 1216/07, Counsel faxed a request for time-loss benefits to Defendants. See Exhibit

C.
7.

On 12/19/07, Counsel faxed a request for pe~ent impairment benefits to
Defendants. See Exhibit D.

8.

On 12126/07, Counsel faxed a letter Defendants offering to discuss the benefit issues.
See Exhibit E. This letter included a copy of an Independent Medical Examination
report prepared by Dr. Richard Radnovich.

9.

On 215/08, Counsel faxed a request for impairment and thD.e-Ioss benefits to
Defendants. See Exhibit F.

10.

On numerous occasions between 10125/07 and 215/08, Counsel (or Counsel's

paralegal) spoke to or left messages for Defendants by phone regarding benefits due
Claimant
11.

Since Claimant's enucleation surgery on 10118/07, Claimant has not received any
time-loss benefits.

12.

Since Claimant's enucleation surgery on 10118/07, Claimant has not received any
permanent impairment benefits.

13.

Counsel for Claimant is informed and believes that Claimant has a financial need for
his workers' compensation benefits.

DATED: February

e-'!

2008.

~<~u~

An

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH- 2

wMarsh

/'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on February

~ 2008.

Gd D kJ};t tQ)

NOTARY PUBLIC m and for the State of Idaho
Residing in: NPcM.ek
My Commission Expires:
1(is:- /iO, z..
I
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83707
Voice: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE O"iIDAHO
JOSE RENTERIA,

Claimant,
VI.

I. C. No. 06-507603

RICK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION, LLC,

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF
MOTION REQUESTING
EMERGENCY HEARING

Employer,

and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST,

Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW the Claimant in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel,
pursuant to Rule VIII(D) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Law, and hereby files this Notice of Withdrawal of Claimant's Motion
Requesting Emergency Hearing filed 217108. Defendant Liberty Northwest has contacted
Counsel for Plaintiff and stated that they would begin paying permanent partial impairment
benefits if Claimant would withdraw the Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing filed 217108.
Dated: this !Yday of February 2008.

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION REQUESTING
EMERGENCY HEARING
Page 1

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
208-345-1000

B

EXHIBIT -.-...:

..

~(/~

Aii~

t..--'

Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on this l2-aay of February 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served as follows:

IXI Via Facsimile Transmission

a Via First Class USPS mail
a Via Certified USPS mail
a Via Hand Delivery

Liberty Northwest
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 83707-1507
Attn: Pat
Fax: ,(800) 972-3213

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

¢i:~~~

An wMarsh
Attorney for Claimant

/

NOTICE OF WITIIDRAWAL OF MOTION REQUESTING
EMERGENCY HEARING

Page 2

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
208-345-1000
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #6588)
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STA~F mAHO
JOSE RENTERIA~
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-507603

vs.
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
RICHARD CARLEY CONSTRUCTION, LLC,AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANrS
"
COUNSEL
Employer,
and
LmERTY NORTHWEST,

Surety,
Defendants.

Comes now Claimant's counsel and "reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case:

REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL·

EXHlBlT-

award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a fmal
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.

Total Amount Benefits to Claimant

$117,878.54

Total Amount Lump Sum New Money

$100,000.00

Attorneys fees incurred in litigation:
Attorneys fees taken prior to lump sum:

$2258.63

Attorneys fees taken from lump sum:

Expenses incurred in litigation:
Expenses previously reimbursed (Dr. Radnovich;
DougCrum):

$25,000.00
$1545.95
$1526.00

Costs to be repaid to Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. from
- LumpSum

Total Attorneys Fees and Costs from settlement
Monies held in trust pending negotiations:

NET AMOUNf TO CLAIMANT

$19.85

-$25,019.95
$0.00

$74,980.05

STATRMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

1.

Seiniger Law Offices .. P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by Jose Renteria ("Claimant") on or

about April 18, 2007.
2.

At the time Counsel was retained by Claimant, the only benefits that defendants conceded

were the medical benefits already incurred and certain TIDs that had been paid but previously

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL -
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discontinued. All benefits received thereafter were as the results of Counsel's efforts, demands,
and negotiations.
3.

This case was settled in mediation before Dennis Burks, Industrial Commission

Mediation Department. Date of mediation was May 22, 2008.
4.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment, and the background to Claimant as it related to potential
disability in addition to impairment, etc.
5.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation
department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
6.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
7.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was recorded

for later use in the handling of the claim.
8.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following

documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the
requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial
Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical providers
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the primary
treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the etiology of Claimant's condition,

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL·
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treatment to date, impainnent rating, and permanent restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for
the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's employment, educational,
medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history; a draft of a complaint and
discovery.
9.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other documents which

were requested as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case
on a periodic basis.
10.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, aspects of

medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and strategic
issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a Workers. Compensation Case.
11.

Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and injuries.

12.

Counsel's

paralegal

spent

many

hours

translating

important

documents

or

correspondence from English into Spanish for the benefit of Claimant, whose native language is
Spanish.
13.

Defendants denied, discontinued or disputed Oaimant's right to the following benefits:

Oaimant"s entitlement to medical and time loss benefits, the nature and extent of impainnent and
disability above impairment, and entitlement to retraining and attorney fees.
14.

On or about 8127/07, Counsel wrote Surety confirming that there should be authorization

for the referral by primary treating physician, Dr. Leo Harf, to eye surgeon specialist Dr. Mark
Boerner on the issue of possible removal of the injured eye. No objection was received from
Surety. After examining Claimant, on 9/13/07 Dr. Boehner scheduled evisceration surgery for
10118/07. On 10117/07, Claimant was informed by Dr. Boerner's office that Surety had not

authorized the next day's surgery and it would have to be cancelled. Counsel immediately

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL -
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contacted Surety by phone and fax and insisted that the surgery must be authorized to proceed as
scheduled. Counsel expressed that Claimant's physicians had determined there was an urgent
medical need for the surgery, and that it might take another month to get the surgery on Dr.
Boerner's schedule as it had the fIrst time. It was also Counsel's position that workers
compensation law required the Employer/Surety to pay for treatment of a workplace injury as
prescribed by Claimant's treating physicians. In response, Surety ultimately agreed to authorize
the surgery and it was performed as scheduled the next day on 10118/07.
15.

Despite Counsel's efforts to obtain authorization for the evisceration surgery on 10118/07,

Counsel did not seek attorney fees on that medical benefIt.
16.

I'
•
f

I
\

Counsel wrote Surety on 10/24/07 and requested TID benefIts on the grounds that Dr.

Boerner had taken Claimant off work during his recuperation from surgery the week before. In .
the ensuing four months, Counsel followed up on the TID request by phone and in writing. No
TID benefIts were received.
17.

On 10125/07. Counsel wrote Dr. Boerner and requested a report of the treatment he had

provided Claimant, a permanent impairment rating, and a statement of pennanent work
restrictions. Counsel received and reviewed his response, and discussed it with Claimant.
18.

Counsel recommended to Claimant that he obtain a permanent impairment rating and a

detailed statement of pennanent work restrictions from an independent medical examiner, so that
Claimant could be effectively evaluated by a vocational expert on the issues of disability beyond
impairment and options for retraining. Counsel's recommendations were based on concerns
involving Claimant's limited work experience, limited job skills (manual labor), youthful age
(25), and language barriers. Claimant concurred, and Counsel arranged for an appointment with

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL -
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vocational medicine expert Dr. Richard Radnovich on 11119/07. Counsel's paralegal attended
Claimant's appoint with Dr. Radnovich and served as translator.
19.

Subsequently, Counsel received Dr. Radnovich's IME report and sent it to Surety on

12119/07 with a request that Surety begin paying PPI benefits for the eye injury. In the ensuing

months, Counsel followed up on the PPI request by phone and in writing. No PPI benefits were
received.
20.

On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Complaint seeking payment of the PPI and lTD

benefits.
21.

On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing on the

grounds that PPI and other benefits were seriously past due and that Claimant had a definitive
financial need for his workers' compensation benefits. The motion was supported by the affidavit
of Counsel Andrew Marsh.
22.

In addition, the motion sought "an award of attorney fees pursuant to lC. §72-804...

[because] Defendants, without reasonable ground and without explanation, and despite repeated
demands from Claimant's counsel, have failed to pay statutory benefits for loss of an eye in a
workplace accident."
23.

On 218/08, Counsel prepared and filed interrogatories and requests for production on

defendants.
24.

On 2113/08, defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint in which they conceded that

PPI benefits were due.
25.

On or about that same time, defendants contacted Counsel for Claimant proposing terms

of payment of PPI benefits. Upon reaching agreement, Counsel filed a Notice Of Withdrawal Of
Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing (including a withdrawal of Counsel's demand for

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL -

6

/31

attorney fees under I.C. §72-804) which read in pertinent part: ''Defendant Liberty Northwest has

I
;

I
,

contacted Counsel for Plaintiff and stated that they would begin paying permanent partial
impairment benefits if Claimant would withdraw the Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing
filed 217/08."
26.

On 2114108, the first PPI check was received, which was nearly four months after the

surgery that gave rise to the eligibility for benefits. On 2122108, the TID check was received.
27.

Following the evisceration surgery, Counsel and his paralegal spent much time working

on arrangements with specialist Sam Murano for authorization and provision of an ocular
prosthetic. Counsel subsequently requested and obtained from Murano a projection for future
prosthesis care and replacement for purposes of proving and negotiating future medical care
benefits for Claimant
28.

Following the IME report from Dr. Radnovich, Counsel recommended and arranged for

Claimant to obtain a vocational evaluation from specialist Doug Crum, who determined that
Claimant should be compensated an additional 15% for disability beyond impairment Counsel
obtained this report for purposes of proving and negotiating PPD benefits for Claimant.
29.

Prior to lump sum negotiations, Counsel reviewed Claimant's wage history with the

date-of-injury employer and concluded that his average weekly wage was higher than that which
Surety had used in the calculations of the original TID benefits, and that there had been previous
periods for which Claimant had not been paid TIDs. Counsel provided his evidence and
calculations to defendants for purposes of proving and negotiating compensation for Claimant
for underpaid TIDs and unpaid TIDs.
30.

Counsel engaged in extensive negotiations with representatives of the defendants.

Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant concerning the status of the case, and the
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strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with respect to settlement discussions and
preparation for hearing.
31.

Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs which would be

incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from his medical providers and related
experts. Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay which would be involved in submitting
this case for resolution to the Commission.
32.

Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. engaged in extensive settlement

negotiations, and participated in mediation. In mediation, a compromise settlement was reached
with representatives of the defendants resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those
which were conceded at the time that Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship.

I

33.

Claimant elected to settle his case based upon his best judgment and hi.s personal

situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been submitted to the
Commission for its approval.
34.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed portions

of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant.
35.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing program

entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced, and other
financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial
Commission Form 1022.
36.

As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between Claimant and

Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately April 18, 2007until
the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining certain cases
because of the size of his caseload, which included this case. Counsel maintained an office and
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staff, including the services of a .full-time paralegal, to be able to handle whatever needs
Claimant had in
37.

conn~tion

with this case, as well as the needs of his other clients.

Claimant is presently unemployed and has 1 and 112 minor children.

.~.~

-.

DAJED this ~ day of June, 2008.

,

I

SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

I

Andrbw C. Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

I

~.~~

I
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on this

S--day of June, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy FORM

1022 REPoRT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF COUNSEL to be served as follows:

~a FIrst Class Mail USPS
- 0 Via Certified Mail USPS return receipt
~ Via Hand Delivery

o Via Facsimile Transmission

Monte Whittier
Harmon, Whittier & Day
6213 N. Cloverdale Road,
Suite #150
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A.

=-:;(i~
1C~--""'""
An
C. Marsh
I."

Attf)mey for Claimant
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMlVfISSION
POBox 83720

COMMISSIONERS

Bo~,TID837~1

Jatne6 F. Kilc, Chairman
R.D. Maynard
Thomas E. Limbaugh

(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321
1-800-950-2110

c.L. "BUTCH" OlTER, GOVERNOR

Mindy Montgomery, Director

June 16,2008
ANDREW C MARSH
942 MYRTLE ST
BOISE, ID 83702
Re: Jose Antonio Renteria-Sotelo vs. Rick Carley Construction and Liberty Northwest
Insurance Company, IC#2006-507603
Dear Mr. Marsh:
This letter is to advise you that the Industrial Commission did not approve the Lump Sum
Agreement on the above captioned claim, as it has not been made clear that the settlement
is in the best interests of all parties.
Ifboth parties wish to proceed with this proposed settlement, the Commission rules
provide that additional infonnation may be submitted, or the parties may jointly request a
hearing on the settlement.
The copies of the Lump Sum Agreement will be returned to Monte Whittier, Counsel for
Liberty Northwest Insurance Company. The original Lump Sum Agreement document
will remain in the Industrial Commission's claim file.
If you have questions, please call me at (208) 334-6002.
Thank you,

n~
LU-:-.

«-0
~

,

Dennis Burks, CPM
Mediator, Idaho Industrial Commission

Cc: Monte Whittier

REC1) JUN 1 ~ 2008
317 Main Street, Boise, ID
Equal Opportunity Employer

EXHIBIT]) /If:j

~COPY.
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE·STATE OF IDAHO
Jose Antonio Renteria,
CIaim.ant,
I.C. No. 06-507603

vs.
Rick Carley Construction LLC,
Employer,

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

and
Liberty Northwest,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimanfs Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above· captioned case.
REPORT OF LmGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Stmet
BoIse. Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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PRIOR TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
TID
BENEFITS, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees $1354.38
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to LSS, on the above $338.59
COSTS, incurred prior to LSS and reimbursed to atty;
$1633.60
includes Claimant's !ME and Claimant's vocational
evaluation expert

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
BENEFITS, LSS
ATTORNEY FEES, on LSS
COSTS, to be reimbursed to atty from LSS

LSS
$55,476.78
$13,603.07

$0.00

Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney
Contingency Fee Agreement In a Worker's Compensation Case including
Disclosure Statement

STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
1.

Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. ("Counsel") was retained by Jose Antonio Renteria

("Claimant") on or about 4118/2007.
2.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential
disability beyond impairment, etc.
3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P A.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Stl'aet
Boise, Idaho 83102
(208) 345-1000
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4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
5.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the
primary treating physician requesting a detailed report of the etiology of Claimant's condition,
treatment to date, impairment rating, and temporary and permanent restrictions; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a
periodic basis.
8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation
case.
9.

Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and

injuries.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
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10.

At the time Counsel was retained by Claimant, the only benefits that defendants

legally conceded were the medical benefits already incurred and certain TIDs that had been paid
but previously discontinued. All benefits received thereafter, including medical treatment and
time loss benefits and impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment
compensation, were as the results of Counsel's reputation, efforts, demands, and negotiations.
11.

Counsel's paralegal spent many hours translating important documents or

correspondence from English into Spanish for the benefit of Claimant, whose native language is
Spanish.
12.

On or about 8127/07, Counsel wrote Surety confirming that there should be

authorization for the referral by primary treating physician, Dr. Leo Harf, to eye surgeon
specialist Dr. Mark Boerner on the issue of possible removal of the injured eye. No objection
was received from Surety. After examining Claimant, on 9/13/07 Dr. Boehner scheduled
evisceration surgery for 10/18/07. On 10/17/07, Claimant was informed by Dr. Boerner's office
that Surety had not authorized the next day's surgery and it would have to be cancelled. Counsel

immediately contacted Surety by phone and fax and insisted that the surgery must be authorized
to proceed as scheduled. Counsel expressed that Claimant's physicians had determined there was

an urgent medical need for the surgery, and that it might take another month to get the surgery on

Dr. Boerner's schedule as it had the first time. It was also Counsel's position that workers
compensation law required the EmployerlSurety to pay for treatment of a workplace injury as
prescribed by Claimant's treating physicians. In response, Surety ultimately agreed to authorize
the surgery and it was performed as scheduled the next day on 10118/07.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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13.

Despite Counsel's efforts to obtain authorization for the evisceration surgery on

10/18/07, Counsel did not seek attorney fees on that medical benefit, even though it was

Counsel's right to do so.
14.

Counsel wrote Surety on 10/24/07 and requested TID benefits on the grounds

that Dr. Boerner had taken Clajmant off work during his recuperation from surgery the week
before. In the ensuing four months, Counsel followed up on the TID request by phone and in
writing. No TID benefits were received.
15.

On 10/25107, Counsel wrote Dr. Boerner and requested a report of the treatment

he had provided Claimant, a permanent impairnient rating, and a statement of permanent work
restrictions. Counsel received and reviewed his response, and discussed it with Claimant.
16.

Counsel recommended to Claimant that he obtain a permanent impairment rating

and a detailed statement of permanent work restrictions from an independent medical examiner,
so that Claimant could be effectively evaluated by a vocational expert on the issues of disability
beyond impairment and options for retraining. Counsel's recommendations were based on
concerns involving Claimant's limited work experience, limited job skills (manual labor),
youthful age (25), and language barriers. Claimant concurred, and Counsel arranged for an
appointment with vocational medicine expert Dr. Richard Radnovich on 11/19/07. Counsel's
paralegal attended Claimant's appoint with Dr. Radnovich and served as translator.
17.

Subsequently, Counsel received Dr. Radnovich's 1MB report and sent it to Surety

on 12119/07 with a request that Surety begin paying PPI benefits for the eye injury. In the
ensuing months, Counsel followed up on the PPI request by phone and in writing. No PPI

benefits were received.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.

942 W. MyrtJe S1reet
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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18.

On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Complaint seeking payment of the PPI

and TID benefits.
19.

On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing

on the grounds that PPI and other benefits were seriously past due and that Claimant had a
definitive financial need for his workers' compensation benefits. The motion was supported by
the affidavit of Counsel Andrew Marsh.
20.

In addition, the motion sought "an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §72-

804... [because] Defendants, without reasonable ground and without explanation, and despite
repeated demands from Claimant's counsel, have failed to pay statutory benefits for loss of an
eye in a workplace accident"
21.

On 218/08, Counsel prepared and filed interrogatories and requests for production

on defendants.
22.

On 2113/08, defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint in which they

conceded that PPI benefits were due.
23.

On or about that same time, defendants contacted Counsel for Claimant proposing

terms of payment ofPPI benefits. Upon reaching agreement, Counsel filed a Notice Of
Withdrawal Of Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing (including a withdrawal of Counsel's
demand for attorney fees under I.C. §72-804) which read in pertinent part: "Defendant Liberty
Northwest has contacted Counsel for Plaintiff and stated that they would begin paying permanent
partial impairment benefits if Claimant would withdraw the Motion Requesting Emergency
Hearing filed 217/08." But for the efforts of Counsel, Claimant would not have received his
PPI benefits and/or would not have received them as soon as he did.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. MyI1Ie S1reet
BoIse, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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24.

On 2114/08, the first PPI check was received, which was nearly four months after

the surgery that gave rise to the eligibility for benefits. On 2/22108, the TID check was received.
But for the efforts of Counsel, Claimant would not have received his TID benefits and/or
would not have received them as soon as he did.

25.

Following the evisceration surgery, Counsel and his paralegal spent much time

working on arrangements with specialist Sam Murano for authorization and provision of an
ocular prosthetic. Counsel subsequently requested and obtained from Murano a projection for
future prosthesis care and replacement for purposes of proving and negotiating future medical
care benefits for Claimant.
26.

,Following the 1MB report from Dr. Radnovich, Counsel recommended and

arranged for Claimant to obtain a vocational evaluation from specialist Doug Crum, who
determined that Claimant should be compensated an additiona115% for disability beyond
impairment. Counsel obtained this report for purposes of proving and negotiating PPD benefits
for Claimant.
27.

Prior to lump sum negotiations, Counsel reviewed Claimant's wage history with

the date-of-injury employer and concluded that his average weekly wage was higher than that
which Surety had used in the calculations of the original TID benefits, and that there had been
previous periods for which Claimant had not been paid TIDs. Counsel provided his evidence
and calculations to defendants for purposes of proving and negotiating compensation for
Claimant for underpaid TIDs and unpaid TIDs. Defendants disagreed and refused to pay any
additional sums for TIDs.
28.

Counsel advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor on education,

training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. Myrtfe StIeet
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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29.

Counsel advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the job site evaluation

from the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division.
30.

Upon receipt of Defendant's discovery requests, Counselor his legal assistant met

with Claimant and prepared responses. Counsel reviewed these responses, made revisions,
counseled with his assistant and Claimant, and served the responses on Defendants and a notice
of service on the Idaho Industrial Commission.
31.

Counsel prepared a request for mediation and notice of service, filed originals

with the Idaho Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants, and then participated in
mediation in 2008. The parties reached a settlement agreement in mediation, but the Commission
or its staff refused to approve the settlement.
32.

Subsequently, Counsel resumed negotiations with Defendants, and on or about

10/22109, reached a new lump sum settlement agreement, which is the subject of this document.
Although Counsel is entitled by law and by the Constitution to receive attorney fees for
having obtained the PPI benefit for Claimant, Counsel has waived his right to said fees in
order to ensure that the new LSSA will receive the approval of the Commission.

33.

Separately from the LSSA, and prior to the LSS agreement even being reached,

the surety sent Counsel its check dated 10/9/09 in the sum of $1243.00, which the surety
intended as a payment (without admission of liability) of disputed attorney fees on Counsel's
demand for attorney fees due pursuant to I.C. 72-804 for alleged unreasonable denial or delay in
payment of PPI benefits. The cover letter for said check is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. As part
of the final LSS negotiations, Counsel agreed to accept surety's check as Counsel's sole and
meager compensation for the enormous time, effort, and expertise expended by Counsel to get

SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. MyrIIe Street
BoIse,Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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the surety to start paying PPI benefits. The attorney fee represented by the surety's check is not
coming out of any benefit funds of Claimant.
dispute, and this firm will not be seeking any attorney fees from our client on the PPI.
34.

Following the oral agreement between the parties for a new LSSA, on or about

11102/09 Counsel refunded to Claimant the attorney fees he had previously received, pursuant to
law and the Constitution, for having obtained the PPI benefit for Claimant. Having done so,
Counsel now has not and will not be receiving any attorney fees for having obtained the PPI
benefits for Claimant.
35.

At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable

because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a
matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of

all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that
constituted available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth
above. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes
available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth above.
36.

There are compensation benefits, as set forth above, available for distribution on

equitable principles. The services of Counsel operated primarily or substantially to secure the
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. MyIIIe Street
BoIse, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintiffs lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation
law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from
the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There
are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien,
including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate;
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as
counselor and advocate; Counsel has a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with
Counsel honored. All terms used in this and the preceding paragraph are used by Counsel in the
context of their fair and reasonable meaning pursuant to, and as limited by, statutory and
Constitutional law.
37.

Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in

extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing.
38.

Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would

be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers.
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for
resolution to the Commission.
39.

Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants

resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. MyriI& SIreet
BoIse, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimanfs best judgment and

40.

personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been
submitted to the Commission for its approval.
41.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed

portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant.
Co~el reviewed

42.

and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing

program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial
Commission Form 1022.
As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between

43.

Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately
4/1812007 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his.practice by declining
certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel

maintained an office and staff, including the services of a fuil-:time legal assistant, to be able to
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his
other clients.
44.

Claimant is presently unemployed.

10
Dated November" 2009.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
-4.~

/.'la-4....

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, PA

942 W. Myr\!e Street
BoIse, klaOO 83702
(208) 345-1000
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

to

I CERTIFY that on November~ 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
KentW.Day
Harmon, Whittier & Day
6213 N. Cloverdale Road, Suite 150
Boise ID 83707-6358
~

Hand delivery

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. Myt1Ie S!I8et
BoIse, Idaho 83702
(208) 34S-100D
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Statement of Costs

I

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
(208) 345-1000
Andrew@ldahoRlghts.com

I

DATE
1119/09

CLIENT NAME
Jose Renteria

ATTORNEY
ACM

DATE
03/31/07
04/18/07
05/01107
05/01/07
05/01/07
06/04/07
08116/07
10/11/07
10/15107
10/15107
11/16107
11/16107
11/16/07
11/18107
02125/08
02l2SI08
02127/08
02127/08
02129/08
02129/08
02129/08
03/18/08
03/18108
03/18/08
03/18108
03/19/08
04111/08
04/16/08
06/04108
07/01108

OUR FILE NO.
-

AMOUNT

DESCRIPTION
Balance forward
Copies - initial client copies
Copies - Initialltr to nc
Postage
Long Distance
Long Distance
Copies - Paystubs and Moo Rec copies
Postage - Op info
Copies - Ltr to Hart
Postage
Copies - Docs to Radnovich
Postage
compact disc
Renteria, Jose - Report, Dr. Radnovich
Copies - Ltr to Client re ID for check
Postage
Copies - Fwd reimbursement check
Postage
Copies - Disco Resp to OPC
Postage
compact disc
PMT #400089430. Renteria, J. costs
Copies - Fwd TID Check
Postage
Copies
PMT #400136023. Renteria, J. costs
Doug Crum., voc eval expert
PMT #400132549. Renteria, J. costs
File Closing
Copies - Mtn for Emerg Hearing w- Affidavit

12.90
0.45
0.39
1.00
1.00
3.00
0.41
0.15
0.41
0.15
0.58
5.00
950.00
0.30
0.41
0.30
0.41
3.75
1.48
5.00
-500.00
0.30
0.41
4.05
-482.00
544.00
-544.00
10.00
2.70

I

BALANCE DUE

II

BALANCE
0.00
12.90
13.35
13.74
14.74
15.74
18.74
19.15
19.30
19.71
19.86
20.44
25.44

975.44
975.74
976.15
976.45
976.86
980.61
982.09
987.09
487.09
487.39
487.80
491.85
9.85
553.85
9.85
19.85
22.55
$0.00

Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your tile. If
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2)
years from the above date.
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SEINIGER LAW OFF/CESs P.A.

Statement of Costs

I

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83102

(208) 345·1000
Andrew@ldahoRights.com

I

DATE
11/9/09

CLIENT NAME
Jose Renteria

ATTORNEY

OUR FILE NO.

ACM

DATE
07/01/08
08/07/08
08/07/08
09/30/08
01/15109
01/15109
02104109
05122109
07/01109
09/10/09
10122109
11/01109

DESCRIPTIOt,l
Postage
VOID: Copies - Fwd PPI check
VOID: Postage
Legal research
Copies
Postage
Depo CopyCopies
Copies
Copies
File Closing
PMT #1102090514. Renteria. J. costs pmt

AMOUNT
0.59
0.00
0.00
10.00
0.90
0.41
60.00
1.35
0.90
0.90
10.00
-107.60

IBALANCE DUE II

BALANCE
23.14
23.14
23.14
33.14
34.04
34.45
94.45
95.80
96.70
97.60
107.60
0.00

$0.00

Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges ofS.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2)
years from the above date.
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ACUERDO Del HONORARIO De CONTIGENCIA EN UN CASO
De COMPENSACI6N DE TRABAJADORES (POR ACCIOENTE INDUSTRIAL)
Este es un acuerdo para la representaa6n y la consulta en una demanda de la
compensaci6n de trabajadores (par accidente industrial) ante la .Comisi6n
Industrial de Idaho. Este acuerdo es entre las OFICINAS DE ABOGADOS
SEINIGER, P.A., 942 Calle Myrtle, Boise, Idaho, 83702, (de aqur en adelante
designados "Abogado") y
Antonio Renteria Sotelo, (de aqur en adelante
designado "Cliente").

Jose

El ABOGADO Y EL CliENTE ACUERDAN COMO SIGUE:
1)

EI Abogado representara al Cliente en la siguiente acci6n: con respecto a
Rentarfa v. Carley Constuctlon, LLC and Liberty Northwest la
demanda de Ia compansacl6n de trabaJadores (por accidente)
Industrial) para la tacha delesl6n del dra March 30, 2008 solamenta.

2)

Por la representaa6n del Cliente, se Ie pagara al Abogado un honorario el
cual estara embargado sobre la causa de la acci6n y sera igual a una
porci6n de todas las cantidades recuperadas par medio de un arreglo 0
adjudicaci6n incluyendo los honorario& de abogado, e incluyendo sumas
recuperadas en la satisfacci6n del mismo de cualquier tercera parte. Esa
parci6n sera como sigue:

i)

Veinticinco par aento (25%) de todas las cantidades
obtenidas para el Cliente despues de la finna de este acuerdo
si el caso se resuelve antes de una audlencla. Sf el Cliente
esta recibiendo beneficias de incapacidad temporales a la
hora de la firma de este acuerdo, entonces el Abogado no.
tomara un porcentaje de ese beneficio hasta que la
aseguranza deje de pagar eI pago 0 amenaza dejar de pag~r
el pago de tal beneficio; si el Cliente ha recibido una
clasificaci6n de impedimento 18 cuat se ha admitido y se esta
pagando, entonces el Abogado no tomara ningun porcentaje
del balance de la clasificaci6n de impedimento al menos que
se dispute despues.

ii)

Treinta par ciento (300/0) de tales cantidades despU8s de una
Budleneia y la demanda sa resuelve sin entablarse una
apelaci6n par cuatquiera de las partes;
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Cuarenta por ciento (40%) de tales cantidades si la demanda
se resuelve despues de que una apelaci6n se entable por
cualquiera de las partes;
EI Abogado tomara un. porcentaJe de cualquier beneficio obtenido por el
Cllente con respecto al impedlmento parcial pennanente sl una
clasiflcaci6n se da despues de que las partes flnnen 88te acuerdo. En el
caso que la Comisi6n conceda los honorarios de Abogado en contra de(l) (los)
demandado(s), el Abogado tendra ef derecho que se Ie paguen esos honorarios
de abogado 0 el porcentaje calculado arriba, el que sea mas.
iii)

3)

No se Ie exigira al Cliente pagar honorarios de abogado al Abogado si
no se recupera nada par medio de un arreglo 0 adjudicaci6n a menos que
el Abogado sa retire debido a la falta de la cooperacl6n del Cliente. En
caso que se requiera que el Abogado se retire debido a la falta de la
cooperaci6n en la presentaci6n y el procesamiento de la demanda del
Cliente, se Ie recompensara (a el) segun 10 dispuesto en el parrafo 7
abajo.

4)

Los costos actuales requerldos para preparar y procesar la demanda
del Cllante por el Abogado, 0 para lograr un arreglo, se pagarin por
el Cllente; si son adelantados por el Abogado, estos costos se pagaran
de la porci6n del Cliente de las cantidades recuperadas; segun definido en
la Secci6n 2, arriba; si no sa l!ega a un arrealo en su caSO, Usted sera
resPOnsable de hacer oaaos por estos costos haSta que estos sa havan
pagado por completo. Estos costos incluyen los honorarios para los
investigadores si son empleados par el Abogado, los honorarios de
entablar el caso, los honorarios para los reporteros de la corte, los costos
de viajar, los costos del servicio de proceso, los costos para los
expeejientes y los informes medicos, los costos para los testigos y los
medicos expertos, los cobros de Ilamadas telef6nicas de larga distancia y
fax, los costos de corrao yenvlo relacionados con el procesamiento de la
demanda del Cliente. EI Abogado esta autorizado, pero no esta obligado,
pagar todas las cuentas medicas pendientes a la hora del arreglo de la
demanda del Cliente de cualquier fondo recibido por el Abogado al
proveedor del cuidado mecJico 0 a su agente designado.

5)

EI Cliente acuerda que at no hara un arreglo excepto con la aprobaci6n
anterior del Abogado, cual aprobaci6n no sera razonablemente retenida.
5i ef Cliente hace esto, esto infringira este Acuerdo, entonces el Clients
acuarda pagarle al Abogado Is suma y la parte indicada en el parrafo 2(ii),
arriba; al arreglarse el caso el Abogado esta autorizado pagar cualquier
cuenta medica pendiente del Cliente directamente al proveedor. EI
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Abogado no !legana a un arreglo del caso sin la aprobaci6n anterior del'
Cliente.
6)

EI Abogado no hace ninguna representaci6n tocante a la probabilidad de
una resoluci6n con exito del caso del Cliente, y no garantiza obtener
suficientes fondos para reembolsarle al Cliente por los costos 0 gastos
incunidos en el procesamiento del caso; se acuerda expUcitamente que
todas las declaraciones del Abogado sobre estos asuntos son
declaraciones de opini6n de buena fe soIamente;

7)

EI Abogado puede ser despedido por el Cliente en cualquier momento. Si
se despide al Abogado, el Abogado sera compensado por los servicios
rendidos hasta la fecha de la despedida, tam bien por todos los costos.
gastos y los desembolsos, como sigue:
i)

Si se despide al Abogado antes de que el caso se resuelva 0
juzgue, entonces se Ie pagara al Abogado el fndice de $150 par
hora 0 un porcentaje calculado de acuerdo con el parrafo 2 (basado
entre la oferta de arreglo mas alta, si alguna, hecha por los
demandados a la hora de la despedida) Ia que sea mas; el Abogado
Ie proporcionana al Cliente con una declaraci6n detallada de tales
servicios.

ii) Si se despide al Abogado despues de que el caso sa resuelva 0

juzgue, la compensaci6n del Abogado se computara de acuerdo con
las provisiones de este acuerdo igual como si el veredicto, la
adjudicaci6n, la determinaci6n 0 el juicio actualmente se haya
recaudado por completo para el Cliente.
iii) EI Abogado tiene el derecho de retener la posesi6n de los

documentos y el dinero del Cliente hasta que la cuenta del Cliente
se haya pagado por completo, y el Abogado tendra un embargo
preventivo en la cau~ de acci6n.

8)
9)

il Clienle Ie pagara al Af)egaEts un antiaps inieial eemo aEtelanle aentFa
los GOstes menoionaEtes en el p.an:afo -4 aFFili)a en la santietaEt ete $100.
EI Cliente acuerda que cualquier interes ganado en cualquiera de los
fondos del Cliente sostenidos en confianza sera donado a Ia Abogacfa del
Estado de Idaho con relaci6n con su programa de Interes en las CUentas
de Confianza de Abogados.

/~()

'J
10)

Ambos el Cliente y el Abogado han leldo este acuerdo. Henen una copia
de el, y atuerdan a sus terminos y condiciones.
No hay otras
representaciones orales 0 escritas entre el Cliente y el Abogado.
Cualquier modificaci6n de ,este contrato sera hecha por escrito.

11)

Este acuerdo sera obligatorio sobre los herederos,
representantes y asignados del Cliente y del Abogado.

12)

Se Ie ha asesorado al Cliente que el Cliente puede recoger una copia del
expediente en este caso dentro de 30 dlas despues de que sa lIegue a un
arreglo 0 despues de que sa tennine la relaciOn entre el cliente y el
abogado par cualquiera de las partes de este acuerdo. Despues de ese
tlempo, el expedlente del Abogado y tod08 los document08 y cosas
en 61 de cualquler fuente serin destruid08.

13)

Se Ie ha asesorado al Cliente que el Abogado puede retenerse en una
base por horas de $150 par hora depositando un anticipo con el Abogado
de $2,000 el cual se repondra cuando el Abogado cobre de el. En el caso
que se retenga al Abogado en una base por horas, el Abogado no tendra
el derecho a ningun porcentaje de cualquier arreglo 0 beneficios
recuperados par el Cliente. EI Cliente ha denegado retener al Abogado en
una base por horas y ha elegido retener al Abogada en una base
contingente descrita en el presente.'

sucesores,

He lefda el anterior y denego retener al abogado en una base por horas.
88te dla l~ de Ah 7; ,
de 2002.

~

Jose Antonia Renteria Soltelo

I~(

I
DECLARACION DE REVELACION (ACCESO)
1.
En asuntos de compensaci6n de trabajadores (par accidente industria!),
los honorarios de abogado normalmente no exceden el veinticinco por ciento
(25%) de los beneficios que su abogado obtenga para usted en un caso en el
cual no se ha completado ninguna aUdiencia en los memos. En un caso en el
cual una audiencia en los memos se ha completado, los honorarios de abogado
normal mente no exceden el treinta por ciento (30%) de los beneficios que su
abogado obtenga para usted.
2.

DependiendO de las circunstancias de su caso, usted y su abogado
pueclen acordar a un porcentaje m6s alto 0 mas bajo el cual serfa sujeto a
la aprobaci6n de la Comisi6n. Ademas, si usted y su abogado tienen una
disputa con respecto a los honorarios de abogado, cualquiera de ustedes
puede hacer una petici6n a la Comisi6n Industrial para resolver la disputa.

Certlftco que he Ie(do y entlendo esta declaracl6n de revelacl6n (acceso) y
Aeuerdo de Honorario de Contingenela, y estoy de aeuerdo eon los
tennlnos eontenldos en el presentee

FECHADO este d(a .:Li:- de

Ab7" I

de 200 1:....

Jose An mo Renteria Sotelo
FECHADO este dla

JD..- de

kpn I
t

de 200

1..

KentVV.DaY,#4372
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, VVHITTIER & DAY
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, Ib 83707-6358
( ..
;(tCEIVED
Telephone (208)327-7561
dtiJUS THlt.L COMMISSION
FAX (800) 972-3213
Employees of the Uberl;y Mutual Group

Attorney for Defendants

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'
. OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Jose Antonio Renteria-Sotelo,
Claimant,
vs.
Rick Carley Construction, LLC,
Employer,
and
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I. C. No.: 2006-507603

STIPULATION AND
AGREEMENT OF LUMP
SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL
AND DISCHARGE

In consideration of the premises and promises and covena.nts hereinafter set forth,
and subject to the above-entitled Commission's approval and Order of Discharge pursuant
thereto, and fu.rther pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 72-707 and 72-404, the above-entitled
parties hereby stipulate and agree in favor of the Claimant, Jose Renteria-Sotelo, as
hereinafter set forth.
1-8TIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE

~©r
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I.
It is agreed that on or about March 30,2006, the Claimant, Jose Renteria-Sotelo,
was employed by Rick Caney Construction LLC, in the County of Ada Idaho, and on the
same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial accident
arising out of and during the course of employment which he then had with the Defendant,
Rick Caney Construction LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily limited to,
retina detachment in left eye and loss of vision in left eye with implant.
All damages, disability, loss, expense and injury, past, present and future, in any
way resulting from or related to the-alleged accident are finally settled and discharged by
-this Agreement.

This is the case whether or not these damages, disability, loss or

expense are now known, recognized or foreseen.
II.
At all times herein mentioned, Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. was the Surety of said
Employer under the Workers' Compensation Laws of the state of Idaho.

III.
Claimant contends, and Defendants deny, that the Defendants are liable for al/ of
the medical expenses and compensation pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Laws of
the State of Idaho as a result of injury sustained from said alleged industrial accident. It is
Defendants' contention that disputes exist in this claim concerning the nature and extent of
injuries, the cause and extent of Claimant's permanent _impairment and disability,entitlement to temporary partial and total disability benefits and,probable amount of future
medical expenses. The parties hereto acknowledge that these are serious questions and
disputes, and that all differences are compromised and settled by this Agreement.

2 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE

In consideration of 1I1is Agreement, all

parties stipulate that the Commission shall,

on and by approval hereof, be deemed to adjudicate these issues and all other issues
arising out of Claimanfs alleged accident and injuries, as provided by the Worbtrs'

Compensation Laws of1l1e State of Idaho.
IV.
At the time of 1I1e alleged accident herein referred to, the Claimant was manied·with

one dependent(s), and was receMng an average weekly wage of $510.31.

V.
It is agreed and stipulated 1I1at on or about Aprl 3, 2006, the Claimant filed a Notice

of Injury and Claim for Compensation with respect to the aforementioned claims with the

Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. It is further agreed that Defendants have paid
Claimanfs medical expenses to date in the sum of $31,612.81.
The following medical and related expenses have been incurred by Claimant
following said accident to the present date, none of ~ich have been paid by Defendants

and all of which will be paid by Claimant from 1I1e proceeds of this lump sum settlement

NONE.

Claimant represents that the above itemization of unpaid medical bills is complete and

aca.arate. and agrees to

Pay any medical bilting, whether indicated above or not. that

remains unpaid as of the date of this Agreement

3 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DiSCHARGE AND
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VI.
By way of settlement of these disputes, the parties agree to the following:
1.

. Medical Expenses Paid by Surety:

Physicians:
Intermountain Eye Clinic
Eagle Eye Surgery & Laser Ctr.
Overton Stiff Anesthesia
Leo Hart
Anesthesia Assoc.
Boise Radiology
Gregory Kent
NW Eye and Laser Center .
Intermountain Eye & Laser Centers
Intermountain Ocular Prosthetic
St. Luke's Regional Medical
Total: $ 23,639.72
Hospitals:
st. Luke's Reg. Med. Ctr
Total: $ 2,281.46
TravellMileage:
Jose Renteria-Sotelo
Medical Service Co.
Total: $

290.54

4/17/06 - 9/18/06
Miscellaneous:
Restat
Gateway
Medical Service Co.
Gateway

Total: $ 5,401.09
TOTAL MEDICALS PAID: $ 31,612.81
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2. Total Temporary Disability
Benefits Owed by Surety:
4/17/06 - 9/18/06
30 weeks, 3 days @
$ 341.91 per week

$ 7,570.86

10/17/07 -11/16107
4 weeks, 3 days @
$ 341.91 per week

$ 1,514.16

08107108 - 08/07/08
1 Day @$48.84 or $341.91 per week

$ 9,133.87

TOTAL TID OWED:
3. Permanent Partial Impainnent:

Dr. Boemer
Total Loss of VIsion by Enucleation
175 weeks@ $310.75 per week

$ 54,381.25

TOTAL PPI OWED:

4. Consideration of lump sum settlement,
disputed compensation benefits of any
kind, accrued and future; waiver of right
to reconsideration and to appeal:

$ 55,476.78
$ 118,991.90

TOTAL LUMP SUM:
LESS TID PAID:
LESS PPI PAID:

($ 10,198.38)
($ 34,108.52)

TOTAL DUE CLAIMANT:

$ 74,685.00

a. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS:
*b. Costs taken priorto LSS:
,
c. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS;
d~' Additional costs to be taken from LSS:
Subtotal (Add c-I:d):
Total ClalmanfaFeea and Coats:

$ 3 38 .59
$1533; 60
$13,603.07

---0-

$13.603.07
$l5,575.05

*COSTS include Claimant's IMB and voc eval experts

5 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
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Itemized list of outstanding medicals to be paid by
Claimant from LSS balance:
Total to Claimant

_-_0-_ _

$61,OSl.93

VII.
All parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of temporary and permanent
dlsablity, if any. and the amount of medical and related care and expense in this matter
are uncertain and In dispute; that pursuant to I.C. § 72-404. it is in the best Interest of the
parties that the above-entiUed claims be fully, finally and forever discharged upon a lump
sum payment by Surety in the amount of $74,685.00, such setliement to discharge

aI~

rights and cJaims to all permanent and temporary compensatiOn, and all medical and

related benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the

parties.
VIII.
Claimant does indemnify and agree to save Defendants hannless from and against
any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to said alleged
accident and any resultant loss, damage or injury, including without limit any claim
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expense.
IX.

In making this Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Settlement. all parties
acknowledge and agree that neither Defendant admits the allegations of Claimant. this

Agreement being solely for the purpose of adjudication and settlement of doubtful and
disputed cJa~.

6 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
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X.
This Agreement is made at Claimant's request and is the acceptance by the
Claimant of the offer of the Surety. By this instrument, Claimant requests settlement be
made in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and further petitions
the Commission for approval hereof and Order of Discharge pursuant hereto. Employer
and Surety herein join in said petition and stipulate that it shall be granted.

XI.
Claimant acknowledges that he has carefully read this Agreement and legal
instrument in its entirety, understands its contents, and has executed the same knowing
. that this Agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of any and all claim of
every kind and character he has or may have against the Employer and Surety on account
of the alleged accident and injury on March 30, 2006.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendants shall pay the
sum within fifteen days following their receipt of the approved and conformed copy of this
entire agreement.

Any interest allowable under the Workmen's Comperysation Laws of

the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue until after the flfteen-day period.
Claimant further acknowledges that he is represented by Andrew Marsh, legal
counsel, in these claims and has reviewed the contents of the Agreement with his
attorney, who has explained the contents hereof and apprised Claimant of the
consequences of his acceptance and execution.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT THESE
PROCEEDINGS ARE CONCLUDED AND FOREVER CLOSED BY REASON THEREOF,
SUBJECT ONLY TO COMMISSION APPROVAL AND ORDER, AND THAT CLAIMANT
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WILL NOT THEREAFTER BE ABLE TO REOPEN THE SAME FOR ANY PURPOSE.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Claimant and Defendants hereby petition the Industrial
Commission for a lump sum settlement as evidenced by these presents.
DATED this

~day of November, 2009
.
_/

..

'')

.AJ / . ,

.Y~:#--·

Jose Rentelfa:Sbtelo, Claimant
APPROVED:

BY.~~
An ewMarsh
Attorney for Claimant

LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY

KentW. Day
I
Attorney for Defendants

~~

.~.-

.
~~--"
~~=::
. eever--'~'.~-.

Liberty Northwest I

. Corp.

~

.
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT

The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly come
before this Commission and that pursuant to I.C. § 72-404, it is in the best interests of the
parties that approving said agreement and Order of Discharge be granted as prayed for,
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be, and the
same hereby is, APPROVED; and further,
Said petition shall be and hereby is granted and the above-entitled proceedings are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this

JL

day of November, 2009.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

BY4lkP~

~
Member

ATTEST:

Assistant Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the

-11t- day of

November, 2009, a true and

correct copy of the STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, I.C."#2006-507603, was served by first
class mail, postage prepaid upon each of the following:
KentW. Day
Law Offices of Harmon, Whittier & Day
6213 N Cloverdale Road
Suite 150
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, 1083707-6358
Andrew Marsh
Attorney at Law
942 Myrtle St.
Boise, 10 83702

JL r. 8.. L ,,'
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REC'D NOV 1 7 2009
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